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Mary Anderson was distraught about the care her 83 year old mother 
was receiving at Shady Village Nursing Home. When she went there to visit 
her yesterday Mary discovered that her mother had a large decubitis ulcer on 
her back. She complained to the Nursing Home Administrator but did not 
think that was enough. She knew that decubitis ulcers can be prevented by 
good quality care. Mary did not want to sue, but she wanted to find out how 
this happened, who was at fault, and to make sure it did not happen again. She 
wondered to whom she should address her concerns - the nursing home om-
budsman? The state agency that licenses long term care facilities? Or some 
other entity? 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Quality improvement ("QI") has become a mantra in virtually all service 
industries, but perhaps more so in health care. In part, QI can be informed by 
consumer and patient complaints. Ideally there is a feedback loop linking com-
plaint information to those responsible for quality improvement. Yet respon-
siveness to complainants and quality improvement efforts can sometimes be at 
odds or at least create tensions. Such tensions arise between, among other 
things, the joint goals of: confidentiality of provider information and transpar-
ency in explaining what happened to patients; provider autonomy and quality 
improvements that require across the board adherence to standards with little 
flexibility; due process in investigating complaints and providing patients with 
timely responses to their inquiries; and between a private mediated resolution 
and public sanctions to deter similar behavior by others. These tensions are 
playing out in a debate between Medicare beneficiary advocates, the Centers for 
Medicare and Medicaid Services ("CMS"), and the Quality Improvement Or-
ganizations ("QIOs") that are currently responsible for responding to benefici-
ary complaints about poor quality health care. That debate is the motivation for 
this paper, which examines what type of entity is most appropriate to respond to 
complaints by Medicare beneficiaries regarding the quality of care they receive. 
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In its relatively short history, the Medicare beneficiary complaint process 
that currently rests within the nation's QIOs has been the subject of three major 
reports - two by the Department of Health and Human Services' ("DHHS") 
Office of the Inspector General ("OIG") and one by the Institute of Medicine 
("10M"). The first of those reports focused on how the process could be im-
proved while remaining within the QIO program. 1 The second report recom-
mended that CMS either make major improvements to the current process 
within the QIOs or establish a complaint process outside of the QIO program? 
The final and most recent report made a single recommendation regarding the 
complaint process- "[t]he QIO in each state should no longer have responsibil-
ity for handling beneficiary complaints, appeals, and other case reviews for 
payment or other purposes."3 As support for taking the complaint process out 
of the QIO program has increased, various suggestions have been made regard-
ing a new "home" for this important function. The second report, prepared by 
the OIG, suggested establishing a new program or contract mechanism within 
CMS or, alternatively, building on "existing entities that already conduct simi-
lar work, such as State survey and certification agencies, State medical licen-
sure boards, and the State Health Insurance Partnership Program.'.4 The most 
recent report, prepared by the 10M, recommended that CMS consolidate the 
beneficiary complaint and review functions "into a few regional or national 
competitive contracts" or, alternatively, "determine the most appropriate agen-
cies with which to contract for [this] purpose in each state.''5 Among those 
agencies, the report suggested "state health departments and the state [s]urvey 
and [ c ]ertification agencies. "6 
The Medicare advocacy community has also made efforts over the last 
several years to raise awareness of deficiencies in the QIO beneficiary com-
plaint process. The Coalition for Consumer and Quality in Health Care Re-
form, the Center for Health Care Rights, the National Senior Citizens Law 
Center, the Center for Medicare Advocacy ("CMA"), the Citizen Advocacy 
Center ("CAC"), and AARP provided official comments on the 1995 OIG Re-
port.7 AARP and CAC provided official comments on the 2001 OIG report. 8 
Most recently, in January 2007, the CMA held a day long working conference 
I. See DHHS OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., PUB'N No. OEI-01-93-00250, THE 
BENEFICIARY COMPLAINT PROCESS OF THE MEDICARE PEER REVIEW ORGANIZATIONS (1995), 
http ://oig.hhs.gov/oei/reports/oei-O 1-93-00250.pdf [hereinafter 1995 OIG REPORT] . 
2. See DHHS OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., PUB'NNO. OEI-0 1-00-00060, THE MEDICARE 
BENEFICIARY COMPLAINT PROCESS: A RUSTY SAFETY VALVE {200 1 ), http://oig.hhs.gov/oei/ 
reports/ oei-0 1-00-00060. pdf [hereinafter 200 1 01 G REPORT] . 
3. INST. OF MEO., MEDICARE'S QUALITY IMPROVEMENT ORGANIZATION PROGRAM: 
MAXIMIZING POTENTIAL 112 {National Academic Press 2006) [hereinafter 2006 IOM REPORT] . 
4. 2001 OIG REPORT, supra note 2, at iii. 
5. 2006 IOM REPORT, supra note 3, at 112. 
6. See 2006 IOM REPORT, supra note 3, at 115. 
7. 1995 OIG REPORT, supra note 1, at 36-49. 
8. 2001 OIG REPORT, supra note 2, at 32-45. 
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for which an earlier version of this paper was commissioned, on alternative 
structures for the Medicare beneficiary complaint process.9 
The most recent push for reform of the QIO beneficiary complaint process 
has come from Congress. On August 2, 2007, United States Senators Charles 
Grassley and Max Baucus introduced Senate Bill 1947, the "Continuing the 
Advancement of Quality Improvement Act of2007." The bill requires a major 
overhaul of the QIO program and would strip the beneficiary complaint func-
tion from the QIOs and place it with new "Medicare Provider Review Organi-
zations."10 This bipartisan bill, which has received support from the Medicare 
advocacy community, 11 awaits action by the Senate Finance Committee. More 
recently, two bills were introduced in both houses that would, among other 
things, make changes to the QIO program's beneficiary complaint process but 
leave the review process with the QIOs. Senate Bill2396 was filed on Novem-
ber 16, 2007, by Senators Orrin Hatch, John Rockefeller, Trent Lott, and Ed-
ward Kennedy. Section 2 of the bill requires that beneficiaries be informed of 
the results of complaints they file about quality of care matters and what actions 
were taken as a result of the complaint. The bill was referred to the Senate Fi-
nance Committee. The same language is included in House of Representatives 
Bill 1046, filed on February 14, 2007, by Congressman Michael Burgess, a 
member of the House Energy and Commerce Committee, Subcommittee on 
Health, the committee to which the bill was referred upon introduction. No 
further action has been taken on any of these legislative proposals. 
While there is considerable merit to removing the complaint process from 
the QIOs entirely and creating a new entity to handle such complaints, this solu-
tion could result in a duplication of effort between the new entity and existing 
state and federal entities in the area of complaint investigation. This Article is 
designed to add to the debate about the most appropriate home for the benefici-
ary complaint process by evaluating an alternative to the QIO complaint struc-
ture based on existing entities that already conduct similar work. First, the 
Article examines the current QIO process, including its history and structure, as 
well as some of the specific areas that have been the subject of particular scru-
tiny over the years, i.e., confidentiality of provider information, corrective ac-
tion, sharing with other agencies, and the number of complaints handled 
annually by QIOs. The Article then sets forth the criticisms of the QIO pro-
gram as identified in several studies, criteria for evaluating alternatives to QIOs, 
and an alternative to QIOs for responding to beneficiary complaints that incor-
porates state survey agencies and state medical boards. This alternative takes 
advantage of already existing expertise in the area of complaint resolution; 
9. See asterisk, supra prior to note 1. 
10. Continuing the Advancement of Quality Improvement Act of2007, S. 1947, !lOth 
Cong. (2007). 
II. See Center for Medicare Advocacy Praises the "Continuing the Advancement of 
Quality Improvement Act of 2007, " MED. NEWS TODAY, Aug. 16, 2007, http://www.medical 
newstoday.com/articles/79723.php (last visited Jul. 13, 2007). 
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however, the alternative is not put forth as a recommendation but rather as a 
springboard for examining the next steps that might be taken to improve the 
Medicare beneficiary complaint process. 12 
II. THE QIO COMPLAINT PROCESS 
A. History 
The QIO Program (formerly referred to as the Medicare Utilization and 
Quality Control Peer Review Organization or "PRO" Program) was created by 
statute in 1982. 13 The QIO program is "the federal government's primary tool 
for assuring that services provided to Medicare beneficiaries are medically nec-
essary, of a quality that meets professionally recognized standards of health 
care, and provided in an appropriate setting."14 The government spends ap-
proximately $400 million a year on the program's forty-one contractors, which 
covers all fifty states and Washington D.C., Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Is-
lands.15 In addition to other quality improvement activities, QIOs have been 
required since 1986 to review and investigate all written complaints received 
from Medicare beneficiaries about the quality of Medicare-covered services 
received in Medicare-certified facilities. 16 
The work of the QIOs is governed by three-year contracts drafted to con-
form to a "Statement of Work" ("SOW") that is produced by CMS. 17 The 
QIOs will operate under the eighth SOW until July 31,2008. 18 During the first 
three SOW contracts, the focus of the QIO program was to ensure the necessity, 
quality, and appropriateness of care rendered to Medicare beneficiaries by iden-
tifying individual clinical problems through random medical record review. 
Since 1993, when the fourth SOW contracts took effect, QIOs have aimed to 
improve the overall practice of medicine by analyzing patterns of care and out-
12. Our research for this paper included a review of the available literature and govern-
ment documents, interviews with two Directors and one former Director of State Survey Agen-
cies, a representative from the Federation of State Medical Boards, as well as conversations with 
a Director of a State Medical Board, a QIO consultant, and staff at CMS. In addition, we re-
ceived comments from the American Health Care Quality Association on an earlier draft of the 
paper. 
13. The Peer Review Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-248, sec. 143, §§ 1151-
1163, 96 Stat. 324 (1982), abolished the old Professional Standards Review Organizations and 
created the Peer Review Organization program, which was intended to be a leaner and more 
effective program than its predecessor. In 2002, PROs were renamed QlOs. See 67 Fed. Reg. 
35,539 (May 24, 2002). 
14. BARRY R. FURROW ET AL., HEALTH LAW§ 3-24 (2d ed. 2000). 
15. 2006 10M REPORT, supra note 3, at 63, 180-81. 
16. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1986,42 U.S.C. § 1320c-3(a) (2000). 
17. See FURROW ET AL., supra note 14, § 3-24. 
18. The eighth SOW began on August I, 2005 and runs through July 31,2008. See 8th 
Round SOW Contract 148 (2005), http://www.cms.hhs.gov/QualitylmprovementOrgs/ 
downloads/8thSOW.pdf. 
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comes and by sharing information with the medical community. This more re-
cent emphasis on patient care and outcomes was initiated in response to rec-
ommendations made in a 1990 10M report which assessed Medicare quality 
assurance efforts. 19 Under this newer approach, random sample record reviews 
were phased out and CMS, at the initiation of the fourth SOW, emphasized the 
importance of the beneficiary complaint process in carrying out the work of the 
QIO program. 
In a 1994 statement describing its vision of a successful PRO five years 
down the road, CMS suggested that these organizations "will have earned a 
position of trust in the eyes of plans, providers, and practitioners and beneficiar-
ies" and that this public trust will be "based on responsive investigation of 
complaints and protection of consumers."20 This view was echoed in a 1995 
report issued by the OIG entitled The Beneficiary Complaint Process of the 
Medicare Peer Review Organizations ("1995 OIG Report")?' In that report, 
the authors noted that, as medical record review declines, "the [QIO] process 
for receiving and investigating complaints from Medicare beneficiaries takes on 
added significance. It becomes a major vehicle through which the [QIOs] can 
identify and respond to individual instances of poor medical care. It is vital, 
therefore, that the complaint process be functioning well."22 
The manner in which QIOs handle complaints has evolved with each suc-
cessive SOW and the significance of this function has increased in response to 
a number of critical reports. 23 A 2001 OIG report entitled The Medicare Bene-
ficiary Complaint Process: A Rusty Safety Valve ("2001 OIG Report"i4 found 
that, at least through the sixth SOW (1999-2002), beneficiary complaints were 
treated as a "distinctly minor activity" by CMS and therefore by the QIOs.25 In 
that sixth SOW, the complaint process fell under "Other Contract Activities." 
This catch-all section represented eighteen percent of the estimated QIO budg-
et.26 
In response to the 2001 OIG Report, the role of the beneficiary complaint 
process was reevaluated and, in the seventh and eighth SOW contracts, benefi-
ciary complaint resolution was included in "Medicare Beneficiary Protection 
Activities." An estimated $45.5 million dollars (or 5.8% of the core contract) 
was allocated to these "Protection Activities" in the seventh SOW.27 In addi-
19. See MEDICARE: A STRATEGY FOR QUALITY ASSURANCE, VOL. 2 (Kathleen N. Lohred., 
The Nat' I Acad. Press 1990). 
20. 1995 OIG REPORT, supra note I, at 2 & F-2 n.7 . 
21. See 1995 OIG REPORT, supra note I. 
22. /d. at i. 
23. See discussion infra. See also 1995 OIG REPORT, supra note I ; 2001 OIG REPORT, 
supra note 2; 2006 IOM REPORT, supra note 3. 
24. See 2001 OIG REPORT, supra note 2. 
25. /d. at 14. 
26. /d. 
27. See2006 IOM REPORT, supra note 3, at 181 tbl.7.7. The IOM report noted that these 
"[ c ]alculations are approximate and were done by the IOM committee on the basis ofCMS da-
ta." /d. The IOM report also noted that the total estimated budget for the seventh SOW was 
2008] THE MEDICARE BENEFICIARY COMPLAINT PROCESS 15 
tion to upgrading the importance ofthe complaint process in the SOW, CMS 
modified the process to "be more service-oriented and responsive to beneficiar-
ies"28 by adopting a case manager approach, revising "Response Determination 
Categories" and subsequent actions to be taken upon a determination offering a 
satisfaction survey to beneficiaries, and offering mediation as an alternative to 
the medical record review process?9 
Following a six-state pilot project conducted in 1998-99,30 the use of me-
diation as an alternative to case review for resolution ofbeneficiary complaints 
was implemented throughout the entire QIO system in September 2003/ 1 but 
the option has met with mixed results. The 2006 10M study, entitled Medi-
care's Quality Improvement Organization Program: Maximizing Potential 
("2006 IOM Report"), found that, as of July 2004, only fifteen states had com-
pleted at least one mediation under this new option.32 According to a CMS of-
ficial, while mediation is currently offered by every QIO, it has not taken off as 
a remedy because it is only available in a small subset of complaints33 and not 
all QIOs are making the same effort to promote mediation.34 Although CMS 
and the QIOs believe that mediation has improved beneficiary satisfaction, they 
also have found it to be labor intensive.35 Therefore, CMS has sought addi-
$1,154.3 million, of which $796.7 million supported core contract activities and $357.6 million 
covered support contracts and special studies. !d. at 180 tb1.7.5. The report further noted that, 
"(a]s of May 31, 2005, the total apportionment for the 8th SOW was slated at $1,265 billion, a 
nine percent increase over that for the 7th SOW." !d. at 179. 
28. CTRS. FOR M EDICARE & MEDICAID SERV., MEDIATION: A NEW OPTION FOR MEDICARE 
BENEFICIARIES TO RESOLVE COMPLAINTS FILED THROUGH QIO I (2004), http://www.cms.hhs.gov 
/BeneComplaintRespProg/Downloads/3a.pdf [hereinafter CMS, MEDIATION]. 
29. ld. 
30. See Press Release, Lumetra, Mediation Becomes Option to Resolve Medicare Benefi-
ciary Complaints (Dec. I 0, 2003), available at http ://www.lumetra.com/about-lumetra/index. 
aspx?rpl01 =46&id= l29. See also 2006 10M REPORT, supra note 3, at 308; 2001 OIG REPORT, 
supra note 2, at 2 & 49 n.5 (citing The California Medical Review Incorporated [now Lumetra], 
in collaboration with the University of California at San Francisco, RAND Corporation, and 
Center for Social Redesign, The Medicare Beneficiary Complaint Alternative Methods Study, 
500-96-P535, Modification POOO 14 (Oct. 1999)). 
3 1. See David G. Schulke, AM. HEALTH QUALITY Ass'N, MEDICARE BENEFICIARY 
COMPLAINT PROCESS- QIOS AND POSSIBLE ALTERNATIVES: COMMENTS AND SUGGESTIONS 2 
(2007), http://www.medicareadvocacy.org/QIOConference/Substantivelnfo/AHQAResponseTo 
LLegalBGPaper.pdf(hereinafter QIO Comments]. 
32. See 2006 10M REPORT, supra note 3, at 319. "(1]n July 2004, CMS released an RFP 
for competitive special study PXX40 I entitled ' Beneficiary Protection Program Activities Al-
ternatives to Traditional Case Review in Beneficiary Complaints' via SDPS Memorandum 04-
304-CO." QIO Comments, supra note 31, at 2. 
33. CMS divides quality complaints into cases where "No Substantial Improvement Op-
portunities are Identified" or "Care Could Have Been Better." Where "Care Could Have Been 
Better," the cases fall into one of three groups:" I) Care Was Grossly and Flagrantly Unaccept-
able; 2) Care Failed to Follow Accepted Guidelines or Usual Practice; 3) Care Could Reasona-
bly Have Been Expected to be Better." CMS considers cases falling into groups 1 or 2 "not 
suitable" for mediation. CMS, MEDIATION, supra note 28, at 2. 
34. Telephone Interview with Commander Sheila C. Blackstock, Director, Division of 
Quality Improvement Program Policy for Acute Care Quality Improvement Group, OCSQ, 
CMS, in Baltimore, MD. (Nov. 22, 2006). 
35. QIO Comments, supra note 31, at 2. 
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tional alternatives to case review. CMS funded a study by New York' s QIO to 
test "Alternative Approach Improvement Methodology," a QIO-facilitated 
method of alternative dispute resolution. Methods developed under this study 
were incorporated into the eighth SOW.36 
B. Complaint Process Generally 
The scope of review ofbeneficiary complaints is set forth in the QIO Ma-
nual published online by CMS. In order for a QIO to handle a complaint, the 
complaint must: 1) pertain to a service covered by Medicare regardless of 
whether the service was covered for the particular beneficiary making the com-
plaint or whether Medicare payment was made on behalf of that beneficiary; 2) 
relate to a service furnished by a health care practitioner, or an institution or 
non-institutional provider who, at the time of the service, was qualified to have 
payment made to them; 3) relate to a service furnished while the complainant 
was a Medicare beneficiary; and 4) be in writing. 37 
The QIO Manual outlines the basic roadmap for a QIO responding to a 
complaint. QIOs are to: 
36. /d. at 3. 
• Acknowledge Receipt of the Complaint 
• Request Medical Records 
• Receive Medical Records 
• Complete Quality Review 
o Determine whether the quality of ser-
vices met professionally recognized 
standards of health care. 
o If no potential quality concern is identi-
fied during retrospective review, com-
plete review and send a written 
determination to the involved provid-
ers/practitioners. 
o If a potential quality concern is identi-
fied, provide notice to the pro-
vider/practitioner to discuss and/or 
provide a response to the potential con-
cern. Complete review and send a writ-
ten determination to the provider/ 
practitioner involved. 
3 7. See CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., QUALITY IMPROVEMENT 0RG. MANuAL 
ch. 5, § 5005 (2003), http://www.cms.hhs.gov/manuals/downloads/qioll0c05.pdf[hereinafter 
CMS, QIO MANuAL]. If a beneficiary attempts to make an oral complaint, the QIO Manual 
states that assistance should be provided to help the beneficiary make the complaint in writing. 
/d.§ 5010. 
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o If a potential quality concern is con-
firmed, give the provider/practitioner 
notice of the QIO's fmal determination, 
including their right to request a re-
review of the determination. 
• Provide an opportunity for the pro-
vider/practitioner to consent to or prohibit the 
disclosure of information that explicitly or im-
plicitly identifies that practitioner. 
• Respond to Complainant 
• Take Corrective Action 
o Require quality improvement plans 
(such as safety measure initia-
tives/preventive measures). 
o Recommend OIG sanction.38 
C. Confidentiality 
17 
The issue of confidentiality has been the Achilles heel of the complaint 
process since the first critical OIG report in 1995. Specifically, QIOs have been 
criticized for responding inadequately to complainants by allowing practitioners 
to prohibit disclosure of information that explicitly or implicitly identifies them. 
The result of this prohibition was that QIO response letters to complainants 
were extremely vague-not even indicating if substandard care had been found. 
The 2001 OIG Report asserted that QIOs have a difficult time obtaining physi-
cian consent, particularly when the medical record review substantiates a qual-
ity of care concern. According to that report, QIOs obtain consent in just 
twenty-one percent of complaint reviews where such a concern is identified 
(and forty-two percent where no such concern is identified).39 
The disclosure prohibition within the complaint process is grounded in the 
Peer Review Improvement Act40 ("Peer Review Act") and the implementing 
CMS regulations. Under the statute, any data or information acquired by the 
QIO must not be disclosed except: 1) to the extent necessary to carry out the· 
goals of the legislation; 2) by regulations that must be designed to assure pro-
tection of the rights of patients and practitioners; and 3) to certain federal or 
state agencies. 41 Based on this statutory framework, CMS promulgated regula-
tions defining "confidential information" as, among other things, "information 
that explicitly or implicitly identifies an individual patient, practitioner or re-
38. !d. §§ 5005-5040. 
39. See 2001 OIG REPORT, supra note 2, at 11. 
40. Peer Review Improvement Act ofl982, Pub. L. No. 97-248, §§ 141 -1 50, 96 Stat. 381 
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1320c-1320c12). 
41. 42 U.S.C. § 1320c-9(a) (2000). 
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viewer."42 The administrative history of the regulations indicates that the agen-
cy believed general disclosure of confidential information would be 
inappropriate, because "the potential is great [that] such information [would] be 
misinterpreted and misused.'"'3 CMS further felt that general disclosure of 
identifying information could "reduce the effectiveness of the peer review 
process."44 
The confidentiality issue is muddied somewhat by another provision of 
the Peer Review Act, requiring QIOs to inform beneficiaries of the final dispo-
sition of a complaint.45 Balancing these two mandates was the subject of a fed-
eral district court case in 2001, in which the nonprofit organization Public 
Citizen sued CMS alleging that the regulations which prohibited disclosure by a 
QIO ofthe final disposition of a complaint investigation were at odds with the 
Peer Review Act.46 In that case, the petitioner, on behalf of a widower who 
complained to a QIO about the treatment his late wife received, argued that the 
confidentiality requirements were incompatible with the statutory requirement 
that the QIO "inform the individual (or representative) of the organization ' s 
final disposition of the complaint.''47 The Court of Appeals for the District of 
Columbia affirmed the lower court ' s decision that the term "final disposition" 
requires a QIO to inform complainants of the substantive (rather than procedur-
al) disposition of the complaint. In a somewhat ambiguous holding, the court 
held that "the statutory command to inform a complainant of the 'final disposi-
tion' of the complaint requires more than what [CMS] currently permits. At a 
minimum, it requires the organization to notify the complainant of the results of 
its review.''48 The court further stated that a QIO must "disclose its determina-
tion as to whether the quality of the services that the recipient received met 
'professionally recognized standards of health care. "'49 The court would not go 
as far as to require a QIO to reveal to a complainant what corrective action it 
took in response to the complaint but stated that doing so "represents a reason-
able elaboration of the meaning of the term [final disposition ].''50 As a result of 
this case, letters to complainants now reveal more information than before, but 
the essential problem of disclosure of practitioner-identifying information re-
mains. QIOs are still prohibited from disclosing such information without con-
42. 42 C.F.R. § 480.10l(b) (2006). 
43 . 50 Fed. Reg. 15,347-0 1, 15,355 (Apr. 17, 1985) (setting forth the final rule for42 
C.F .R. pts. 400 and 4 76). 
44. /d. 
45. The Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-509, Sec. 9352, 
I 00 Stat. 1874, 204 7 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1320c-3(a)( 14) (2000)) added this 
section. 
46. Publ ic Citi zen, Inc. v. Dep ' t of Health & Human Servs., 332 F.3d 654 (D.C. Cir. 
2003), aff'd, 151 F. Supp. 2d 64 (D.D.C. 2001). 
47. !d. at 657 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1320c-3(a)(l4) (2000)). 
48 . !d. at 656. 
49. !d. at 671 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1320c-3(a)(l 4) (2000)). 
50. !d. 
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sent5 1 and are therefore limited in the information they can provide to com-
plainants. 
CMS has attempted unsuccessfully to address this issue of confidentiality. 
In response to the 1995 OIG Report, CMS worked on revising the confidential-
ity regulations, but reported that it was unable to publish a final rule. 52 In his 
response to the 2006 10M report, Secretary of the Department of Health and 
Human Services, Michael Leavitt, again addressed the issue and stated that "in 
addition to the current beneficiary complaint work, CMS is determining how it 
can permit the disclosure of information from complaint review to beneficiaries 
and restrict redisclosure of this information and its use in liability actions. "53 
In the view of the authors of the 2006 10M Report, the "QIO confidential-
ity restrictions are not necessary or supportable in the current era of public re-
porting and are incompatible with the aim of a national performance 
measurement system and the goal of CMS to serve multiple audiences with a 
transparent system. "54 The report further notes that "[b ]ecause the QIO legisla-
tion gives the Secretary of DHHS the authority to set confidentiality standards 
by regulation, new legislation for this purpose is not necessary" and may there-
fore be modified by the Secretary to increase the transparency and responsive-
ness of the Q10s.55 
D. Corrective Action 
It is clear from the QIO Manual that corrective actions on the part of a 
QIO following a substantiated complaint investigation, while permitted, are not 
considered an integral part of the complaint process. The 2001 OIG Report 
found that QIOs "rarely take any action beyond a notification letter to providers 
51. See CMS, QIO MANUAL, supra note 37, § 5020, § 5025, & exh.5-17 (Final Response 
to Inquirer Model Notice (Concern Involved Practitioner)). The model final response Jetter in a 
case in which the involved practitioner does not consent to disclosure states: 
We have carefully examined your concem(s) and conducted a thorough re-
view of the medical records pertaining to the services that (you or name of 
beneficiary) received. Federal regulations prohibit us from releasing infor-
mation that identifies the involved practitioner without his or her consent. 
Because the involved practitioner did not give (his or her) consent, we are 
unable to release information that would explicitly or implicitly identifY 
him/her. This does not necessarily mean that we found a problem with the 
services (you or name of beneficiary) received. However, we will take ap-
propriate action if warranted by our review findings . 
!d. exh.5-17. 
52. See 2001 OIG REPORT, supra note 2, at i. 
53. Michael 0. Leavitt, SEC'Y OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES, REP. TO CONG.: 
IMPROVING THE MEDICARE QUALITY IMPROVEMENT ORGANIZATION PROGRAM- RESPONSE TO THE 
INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE STUDY 22-23 (2006), 
http://www.cms.hhs.gov/QualitylmprovementOrgs/down 
Joads/QIO _Improvement_ RTC _ ful. pdf. 
54. See 2006IOM REPORT, supra note 3, at 125. 
55. !d. 
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and practitioners in response to confirmed quality concerns based on com-
plaints."56 The same report found "no examples of a [QIO] calling for remedial 
training, coursework, or special supervision. "57 The report also found that 
"more serious interventions, such as referring a physician to the State medical 
board . .. were even rarer."58 Only nine of the fifty QIOs that responded to the 
survey undertaken in that study "reported making such a referral at least once 
during their fifth [SOW]" (a period of three years). 59 Likewise, the study found 
that QIO referrals to state survey agencies are uncommon, finding that only "six 
[QIO]s reported making such referrals for confirmed concerns during their fifth 
[SOW]."60 
The QIO Manual offers the following non-directive advice regarding cor-
rective actions a QIO may undertake: 
You may engage in a variety of activities, including the 
development of corrective action plans, to improve care 
rendered by providers/involved practitioners when qual-
ity concerns are identified .. . . You may consider coor-
dinating efforts with other entitles such as 
intermediaries, carriers, State Agencies, CMS Regional 
Offices, . . . OIG, or State licensing/certification boards 
to effectuate corrective action . . . . You may also con-
sider initiating improvement projects, when appropri-
ate/feasible. 61 
Under statute, a QIO may initiate sanction proceedings by referring case infor-
mation and sanction recommendations to the OIG.62 The QIO Manual instructs 
QIOs to initiate sanction procedures when they "identify failure by a practitio-
ner in a substantial number of cases to comply with his/her obligations and/or a 
gross and flagrant violation as specified in section 1156(b) of the Act and 42 
CFR I 004.1 (b) ... . "63 In a critical 2005 news article, Gilbert M. Gaul of the 
Washington Post reported that, "from 1986 to 1994, QIOs recommended 278 
sanctions against all providers, mostly doctors. From 1995 to 2003, they rec-
ommended 12 sanctions, according to the inspector general ' s office. In four of 
the nine years, there were none at all."64 Gaul concluded that this downward 
56. See 2001 OIG REPORT, supra note 2, at 9. 
57. /d. 
58. /d. at 10. 
59. /d. 
60. /d. 
61. See CMS, QIO MAN UAL, supra note 37, § 5040. 
62. 42 U.S.C. § 1320c-5(b)-(c) (2000); 42 C.F.R. § 1004.70 (2006). 
63 . See CMS, QIO MANUAL, supra note 37, § 5040. 
64. Gilbert M. Gaul, Once Health Regulators, Now Partners: Private Groups Limit Pa-
tient Access to Medical Files, Rarely Punish Doctors, W ASHINGTON P OST, July 26, 2005, at AI . 
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trend is related to the current QIO emphasis on collaborating with providers.65 
The authors of the 2006 10M Report believe that this drop in sanction recom-
mendations is not likely to change given that, under the current SOW, QIO 
evaluations (by CMS) will be tied to hospital satisfaction ratings to a greater 
degree than under previous SOWs.66 
E. Sharing With Other Agencies 
One might argue that QIOs need not sanction health care providers for 
poor quality care as that is already done by state survey and certification agen-
cies and state medical boards. Yet, these state agencies and boards must know 
about provider infractions or complaints before they can respond to them. Con-
sequently, one might expect the agencies to share information, but this does not 
happen on a routine basis. 
No formal relationship, for example, exists between state medical boards 
and QIOs. In nonbinding language, the QIO Manual suggests that QIOs 
"[p ]articipate in the overall beneficiary complaint network with other entities"67 
and "[a]dvise these groups of[the QIO's] role and responsibility in investigat-
ing beneficiary complaints, and solicit information regarding their role andre-
sponsibility. "68 
According to a 2006 DHHS study entitled State Discipline of Physicians 
("2006 DHHS Board Study"), most state medical boards do not seek informa-
tion from QIOs and "only a few Boards in 2003 had formal information sharing 
agreements with QIOs."69 
Currently, QIOs are not required to report individual practitioners to the 
appropriate state medical boards for purposes of investigation or discipline. 
The only entity to which the QIOs are required to report individual physicians 
is the OIG but, as mentioned earlier, only in the case of repeated or gross viola-
tions of duty.70 According to QIO regulations, "[a] QIO must disclose confi-
65 . I d. However, according to the American Health Care Quality Association (AHCQA), 
the decrease in the number of providers referred to the OIG for sanctions is related to the sig-
nificant decline in retrospective record review activity undertaken by QIOs since the fifth SOW 
(under which random record reviews were phased out). See QlO Comments, supra note 31, at 
5-6. 
66. See 2006 IOM REPORT, supra note 3, at 113. 
67. See CMS, QIO MANUAL, supra note 37, § 5045. 
68. Jd. 
69. RANDALL R. BOVBJERG ET AL., DHHS, STATE DISCIPLfNE OF PHYSICIANS: ASSESSfNG 
STATE MEDICAL BOARDS THROUGH CASE STUDIES 34 (2006), http://aspe.hhs.gov/daltcp/reports/ 
2006/stdiscp.pdf (hereinafter 2006 DHHS BOARD STUDY] (citing FEDERATION OF STATE 
MEDICAL BOARDS, EXCHANGE: LICENSfNG BOARDS, STRUCTURE AND 0ISCfPLINARY FUNCTIONS 
tb1.29 (2003)). Only twelve Boards reported having formal agreements with QIOs and twelve 
more reported receiving assistance from QIOs on an occasional basis. Jd. at 80 n.47. 
70. In comments made on the initial draft of this paper, AHCQA stated that under CMS 
guidance immediate reporting to a licensing authority "should occur" in the case of grossly or 
flagrantly unacceptable care or immediate harm to a patient. See QIO Comments, supra note 
31, at 6-7 (emphasis added). However, the guidance to which AHCQA refers is arguably op-
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dential information upon request, to State or Federal licensing bodies responsi-
ble for the professional licensure of a practitioner .... "71 The regulation fur-
ther states that "a QIO may provide the [confidential] information ... to the 
State or Federal licensing body without request."72 In egregious cases, addi-
tional CMS guidance provides that QIOs must report complaints to the appro-
priate licensing board. 73 We were unable to find information as to how often 
QIOs report offending physicians to state medical boards, however, when ex-
trapolating from the number of physicians that QIOs report to the OIG/ 4 the 
incidence is presumably quite low. 
The QIO Manual also states that QIOs may "consider coordinating efforts 
with other entities such as intermediaries, carriers, State Agencies, CMS Re-
gional Offices, Office of the Inspector General, or State licensing/certification 
boards to effectuate corrective action .... "75 Any such efforts must conform to 
disclosure requirements, which are consistent with the QIOs ' overall confiden-
tiality policy: only fraudulent actions or actions involving imminent danger to 
individuals can be reported to state agencies without first notifying the provider 
of the disclosure to the state.76 Based on interviews with state survey agency 
directors, many state agencies are unaware that QIOs respond to beneficiary 
complaints. One state survey agency director with whom we spoke commented 
that there are potential dangers to having parallel state complaint processes that 
do not communicate with each other, the most important being the possibility of 
a dangerous situation existing without the state survey agency being aware of it. 
F. Number of Complaints Handled by QJOs 
QIOs are required to report beneficiary complaint information in their an-
nual reports, which must be posted on individual QIO websites. We researched 
the websites of all fifty-three QIOs in December 2006. At that time, forty-five 
out of fifty-three QIOs had their annual reports available online, although many 
did not have the most recent report online. Judging from the number of com-
plaints reported by QIOs on their websites, the greatest number of complaints 
received by a QIO in a single fiscal year was 306 in California in fiscal year 
2005 .77 This is the equivalent of0.71 complaints per 10,000 Part A Medicare 
beneficiaries in California. At the time of our review, eight of the QIOs re-
tiona!. 
71. 42 C.F.R. § 480.138(a)(l)(i) (2006) (emphasis added). 
72. /d. at (a)(l)(ii) (emphasis added). 
73. See QIO Comments, supra note 31, at 6-7. 
74. See supra note 64. 
75. See CMS, QIO MANUAL, supra note 37, § 5040. 
76. See 42 C.F .R. § 480.1 05(b )(2) (2006). 
77. See Lumetra, California Annual Medical Services Review Report: Time Frame 
11 11 /2004-10/31 /2005, http://www.lumetra.com/uploadedFiles/resource-center/Docs/annual-me 
dical-services-review-2005. pdf. 
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ported fewer than ten complaints in a single year in their most recently posted 
annual reports . 78 
The 2006 10M Study reported that the number of complaints reviewed by 
QIOs nationwide is surprisingly small- approximately 3,000 during fiscal year 
2004, or about one for every 14,000 beneficiaries.79 Following the fifth SOW, 
CMS published a document that compiled the number and nature of complaints 
filed with QIOs during that SOW. In the three-year contract period, QIOs re-
ceived 7,218 quality complaints, 1,407 (19.5%) of which had at least one con-
firmed concern. 80 Information about the numbers and types of complaints 
received by QIOs is difficult to attain. CMS requires QIOs to post annual re-
ports online and provides them with a template to do so. However, in our opin-
ion, the template does not set forth information in a user-friendly way and 
therefore makes complaint information difficult to decipher. 
III. CONCERNS ABOUT THE CURRENT QIO SYSTEM 
As previously stated, the QIO complaint process has been the source of 
several critical reports since 1995. 81 In March of2006, the Institute ofMedi-
cine issued a report that recommended taking the beneficiary complaint process 
out of the QIOs.82 This report reviewed the QIO program as a whole and in-
cluded recommendations regarding the beneficiary complaint process. There-
port was requested under section 1 09( d)( 1) of the Medicare Prescription Drug, 
Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003 to help the Senate Finance 
Committee understand how the QIO program fits within the evolving perform-
ance improvement efforts in the nation's health care system.83 In addition to 
these critical reports, the process was the subject of the lawsuit discussed 
above.84 
Although CMS made changes in response to each negative report, the 
criticisms have been fairly consistent over time. Such criticisms may therefore 
indicate that the identified problems with the complaint process are intractable 
systemic issues that cannot be resolved without a significant programmatic 
overhaul. The most consistently reported criticisms of the QIO complaint 
78. The eight Q!Os were in Delaware, Hawaii, Montana, Nebraska, South Dakota, Ver-
mont, Virgin Islands, and Wyoming. 
79. See 2006 IOM REPORT, supra note 3, at 113 . 
80. CMS Office of Clinical Standards & Quality, Data Review Project, Peer Review Or-
ganizations (PROs), 5th Scope of Work: National Findings ( 411996-2/2000), http: //provide 
rs. ipro. org/shared/adrnin _ memos/medi care/200202. pdf. 
81. See notes l-3 supra and accompanying text; 1995 OIG REPORT, supra note l ; 200 l 
OIG REPORT, supra note 2; 2006 IOM REPORT, supra note 3. 
82. See 2006 IOM REPORT, supra note 3, at 112-14. 
83. /d. at I. 
84. Public Citizen, Inc., 332 F .3d 654 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (aff'd Public Citizen, Inc., 15 I F. 
Supp. 2d 64 (D.D.C. 2001)). 
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process can be divided into categories of accessibility, responsiveness, effec-
tiveness, and accountability. 
In terms of accessibility, or the ease with which the complaint process can 
be accessed by beneficiaries, the QIOs do not score well. Both the OIG and the 
10M found that Medicare beneficiaries lack awareness of the QIO complaint 
review function and that the process is difficult to access. 85 Although there is 
no current information regarding the number of beneficiaries who know about 
the QIO complaint process, the 1995 OIG Report found that seventy-seven per-
cent of Medicare beneficiaries were not aware ofthe QIOs.86 The 2006 IOM 
Report noted that in general, many beneficiaries may be unaware of their local 
QIO and more specifically, its complaint review functions, "even though the 
contact information for all QIOs is listed in the Medicare handbook."87 Addi-
tionally, the 10M Report noted that even if the Medicare beneficiary finds the 
QIO internet home page, only some QIO websites "prominently feature infor-
mation on how consumers can submit complaints."88 For example, when we 
reviewed the homepage of California's QIO, Lumetra, it recommended that 
beneficiaries call the National Medicare Hotline rather than contact the QIO 
directly. 89 Secretary Leavitt admitted that accessibility was a problem in his 
2006 response to the 10M study in which he stated: "To support needed 
changes in the QIOs very important complaint review activities, CMS will en-
gage QIOs to expand outreach to beneficiaries through media, print publica-
tions, direct communications, and work with the CMS Ombudsman on 
developing a link on the CMS web page."90 
QIOs have also been consistently criticized for their lack of responsive-
ness to complainants, specifically that they do not respond in a meaningful 
way.91 In response to the court's ruling in the Public Citizen case, QIOs now 
provide complainants with their determination as to whether the quality of the 
services met professionally recognized standards ofhealth care. However, they 
still do not reveal information that identifies a practitioner. This fact, coupled 
with the fact that the QIOs refer so few practitioners to state medical boards, 
85. See 1995 OIG REPORT, supra note I, at 5-6; 2001 OIG REPORT, supra note 2, at 7-8; 
2006 IOM REPORT, supra note 3, at 113-14. 
86. See 1995 OIG REPORT, supra note I , at 5. 
87. See 2006 10M REPORT, supra note 3, at 113. 
88. /d. 
89. See Lumetra, For Medicare Members, http ://www.lumetra.com/resource-
center/index.aspx?id= l30 (last visited Jul. 13, 2007). QIOs are required to post this toll-free 
phone number on all beneficiary-targeted materials, including websites. See QIO Comments, 
supra note 31, at 9. However, QIOs are not required to direct all complaints to that number. In 
contrast to Lumetra's website, at the time of our review, the website of the Delmarva Foundation 
(the QIO for Maryland and the District of Columbia) had a link on its homepage informing be-
neficiaries how to make complaints about quality of care directly to the Delmarva Foundation. 
See Delmarva Foundation, Consumer Medicare Resources, http://www.delmarvafoundation.org 
/consumers/medicare/complaints.html (last visited Jul. 13, 2007). 
90. Leavitt, supra note 53, at 23. 
91. See 1995 OIG REPORT, supra note I, at 6; 2001 OIG REPORT, supra note2, at 11-12. 
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means that the process essentially has no corrective consequences for practitio-
ners. 
QIOs have also been criticized for failing to use complaint data in a man-
ner that helps identify patterns of poor care, despite the fact that the primary 
responsibility ofQIOs is to encourage quality improvement in Medicare." The 
2001 OIG Report found that "just [one] of 50 [QIOs] reported implementing a 
quality improvement project based on beneficiary complaints."92 In this same 
vein, QIOs have been criticized for treating "complaints as individual incidents, 
rather than as potential signs of systemic problems. "93 In terms of investigative 
capacity, the OIG found that QIOs do not use full Congressionally-authorized 
investigative authority and rarely go beyond record review when investigating a 
complaint.94 
Any adequate complaint system must have the ability to apply remedies or 
sanctions upon substantiating a complaint. QIOs have been criticized for rarely 
taking action beyond a letter to the provider or practitioner who was found to 
have provided substandard care.95 Further, as mentioned above, QIOs rarely 
make referrals to licensing boards96 and the number of sanctions against physi-
cians recommended by QIOs has dropped dramatically since 1986.97 
According to the 2006 10M Report "QIO surveys of complaints revealed 
high levels of beneficiary satisfaction with the complaint review process but 
much lower levels of satisfaction with the outcomes of the reviews."98 CMS 
reports that "93% of complainants are now satisfied with the review process."99 
This satisfaction with the process makes sense given that, after the 1995 OIG 
report, CMS changed its guidelines for how long the complaint process should 
take, reducing "the total days allowed from 250 to 165 days and developing 
model letters to improve the readability of[QIO] responses to complainants."100 
From the beneficiary's point of view, however, the outcome of the reviews is 
still unsatisfactory, according to the 10M report. 101 This may well have to do 
with the intractable confidentiality problem. As Secretary Leavitt noted in his 
recent report to Congress, " [ m ]ost complainants want a process that helps them 
understand what happened, and if there is something that should not have oc-
curred, they want to know that action has been taken to prevent future occur-
rences." 
1 02 
92. 200 I OIG REPORT, supra note 2, at II . 
93 . /d. at 8. 
94. /d. at 8-9. 
95. !d. at 9. 
96. 2001 OIG REPORT, supra note 2, at 10. 
97. See 2006 10M REPORT, supra note 3, at 113. 
98. /d. at 114. 
99. Leavitt, supra note 53, at 22. 
100. 2001 OIG REPORT, supra note 2, at 2. 
101. See 2006 10M REPORT, supra note 3, at 114. 
I 02 . Leavitt, supra note 53, at 22. 
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Finally, QIOs were criticized in the 2001 OIG Report because the QIO 
complaint process is not subject to public accountability. 103 Aggregate data 
regarding QIO complaint investigations is not available on the CMS website. 
Such data can only be compiled through the often outdated and difficult to de-
cipher information on individual QIO web pages. 
A number of reports have identified obstacles to QIO effectiveness in the 
area ofbeneficiary complaints. In addition to the confidentiality constraint, the 
OIG and 10M have enumerated various "conflict of interest" issues that dis-
courage QIOs from treating beneficiary complaints as a high priority activity. 
These include the fact that: 1) "CMS' contracts with [QIOs] treat complaints as 
a distinctly minor activity;" 104 2) "[QIOs] tend to be more oriented [toward] the 
medical community than to the beneficiary community;"105 3) QIOs do not con-
sider beneficiaries primary clients; 106 4) "technical assistance activities are in-
compatible with a strong regulatory function;" 107 5) the QIO mission is to 
attract providers to enroll in quality improvement programs; 108 and 6) evalua-
tion ofQIOs by CMS is based, in part, on hospital satisfaction ratings. 109 In its 
2006 report, the 10M recommended that CMS ease conflict of interest restric-
tions with regard to QIO subcontracts. The report suggested that, given limits 
on federal funding, "QIOs should be allowed to seek funds for quality im-
provement activities from providers and other organizations as appropriate."110 
While this recommendation may help QIOs achieve their mandated objectives 
overall, loosening conflict of interest restrictions is bound to make it even more 
difficult for QIOs to juggle their various roles vis-a-vis health care providers 
and beneficiaries. 
IV. ALTERNATIVE TO QIOS FOR RESPONDING TO BENEFICIARY 
COMPLAINTS 
In this section, we evaluate an alternative entity to QIOs for responding to 
Medicare beneficiary complaints. The alternative takes advantage of existing 
structures that currently respond to patient complaints about quality of care: 
state survey agencies and state medical boards. Below we describe how these 
entities respond to patient complaints and, in the final section, we discuss and 
103. See 2001 OIG REPORT, supra note 2, at 13-14. 
104. /d. at 14. 
105. /d.atl5. 
106. See 2006 IOM REPORT, supra note 3, at 112. 
I 07 . /d. at 113. "[W]orking collaboratively with providers and investigating their activi-
ties within a single contract can create an inherent conflict of interest for the QIOs." /d. at 114. 
108. /d. at 113. 
109. ld. QIOs will be under more pressure to improve relations with providers in the 
eighth SOW because the weight of hospital satisfaction ratings will increase to twenty-five per-
cent ofQIO evaluation. /d. 
110. /d. at 139. 
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evaluate a combined alternative structure which builds upon the extensive ex-
perience these entities have in dealing with complaints about patient care. 
In their reports, both the 10M and OIG stated that in addition to looking at 
existing organizations, CMS might consider establishing a new program or con-
tract mechanism within CMS to respond to beneficiary complaints. 111 As we 
approached the issue of where the beneficiary complaint process should be 
lodged, we considered the possibility of CMS or QIOs contracting with a new 
entity that would be devoted solely to handling and resolving Medicare benefi-
ciary complaints.112 Presumably, this entity would be funded by money cur-
rently directed to QIOs for this process and would be subject to specific 
uniform criteria as to the handling of complaints. The benefit of creating a 
separate contract for this function would be the opportunity to establish an en-
tity that would be specifically focused on responding to beneficiary complaints. 
At a minimum, this could reduce concerns about QIO conflicts of interest. 113 
We did not address the feasibility or benefits of such a new entity or how 
it might be constructed. Rather, on initial reflection, we concluded that such an 
entity would likely face some of the same problems that now trouble QIOs. 
These problems include lack of visibility, lack of available sanctions, and, pos-
sibly, the same confidentiality issues. In addition, if the contracts were given to 
newly created entities it would duplicate the efforts of existing organizations 
that currently receive and investigate complaints in each state and have consid-
erable experience doing so. 
Although there is merit to both solutions, we chose to assess the feasibility 
of relying on existing mechanisms with better coordination as, arguably, an im-
portant next step before moving forward to establishing a new entity. While 
existing mechanisms for complaint review have pros and cons, an understand-
ing of how they function provides a possible alternative solution to a new entity 
or, in the case a new entity is created, can inform the characteristics of the new 
entity. 
Ill . See 2006 IOM REPORT, supra note 3, at 112; 200 I OIG REPORT, supra note 2, at iii. 
112. This is the model proposed inS. 1947, see supra note 10. 
113. Having QIOs subcontract for specific tasks has been considered by CMS. During the 
drafting of the eighth SOW, CMS discussed the possibility of allowing or requiring QIOs to 
subcontract out those tasks for which the QIOs were unable to demonstrate competency ( compe-
tency demonstrated through successful evaluation of performance under a previous SOW or 
other CMS-approved means). This idea was not well received by the QIO community, which 
argued that such a rule would be inconsistent with existing Jaw and would favor non-QIOs be-
cause they would be "free to seek the work ofQIOs without meeting the tests Congress estab-
lished for QIOs" to qualify for funding. See Letter from David G. Shulke, Executive Vice 
President of the American Health Quality Association, to Secretary Mack McClellan, Adminis-
trator, CMS 5 (Sept. 20, 2004), http://www.ahqa.org/pub/uploads/AHQACommentsSOW8 
DraftSummary.pdf (regarding the proposed eighth SOW). 
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A. State Survey Agencies 
State survey agencies have been mentioned by the 10M and OIG as poten-
tial alternatives to QIOs in responding to consumer complaints about quality of 
care in health care facilities. 114 All fifty states and the District of Columbia 
have an office that is responsible for surveying and licensing health care institu-
tions within that state. These agencies, which often have toll-free numbers and 
websites with information about how to make a complaint, routinely receive 
complaints and conduct complaint investigations. 
The survey function is carried out under agreements between the state and 
the Secretary ofDHHS in order to ensure that all providers participating in the 
Medicare and Medicaid programs meet minimum health and safety standards or 
"Conditions of Participation." These providers may include: ambulatory sur-
gery centers, community mental health centers, end stage renal disease facility 
providers, home health providers, hospices, hospitals, intermediate care facili-
ties for the mentally retarded, clinical laboratories, nursing homes, psychiatric 
residential facility providers, rehabilitation providers, and rural health clinics. 
These facilities are also licensed by states, which may have additional quality 
standards that the facilities must meet for licensing purposes. The survey and 
complaint response functions are supported, in part, by CMS, which provides 
funding to the states to carry out these tasks. 115 
The Association of Health Facility Survey Agencies (AHFSA), a national 
association of state survey agencies, provides a forum for directors of these of-
fices to share information and address common interests. AHFSA has one paid 
staff person and a board of directors comprised of directors of state survey 
agencies. The mission of the organization is to "strengthen the role of its mem-
ber state agencies in advocating, establishing, overseeing, and coordinating 
health care quality standards that will assure the highest practicable quality of 
health care for all state and federally regulated health care providers."116 
I . History of Responsiveness of State Survey Agencies to Consumer Com-
plaints 
There is little information or data available about the responsiveness of 
state survey and licensing agencies to consumer complaints. To the extent data 
exists, it has focused primarily on complaints regarding nursing home care. In 
114. See supra notes 2-3. 
115. While every state is required by federal law to conduct surveys of nursing homes for 
purposes of Medicare certification, states vary in terms of the extent to which they conduct sur-
veys of other institutional health care providers. Most states, for example, "have to a greater or 
lesser degree incorporated JCAHO accreditation into their hospital licensure standards." 
FURROW ET AL., supra note 14, at 8. As a result, states may not routinely survey hospitals and 
rely on JCAHO to carry out this function . 
116. Ass'n of Health Facility Survey Agencies, AHFSA Mission, http://www.ahfsa.org/ 
about%20ahfsa.htm (last visited Jul. 16, 2007). 
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1995, the Health Care Financing Administration (HCF A) (now CMS), was 
concerned about problems with state survey agency responses to nursing home 
complaints and "developed complaint investigation protocols for States" to fol-
low.II7 However, the General Accounting Office (GAO) determined in a 1999 
report that such protocols were not sufficient. I Is In that report, the GAO docu-
mented that states did not always investigate complaints of harm to nursing 
home residents promptly or at all, II 9 despite the fact that all state agencies must 
conduct certification surveys of nursing homes and "maintain procedures and 
adequate staff to investigate and report on the nursing home complaints they 
receive." IZO 
In response to the GAO report, then-HCF A Administrator, Nancy-Ann 
DeParle, met with the Board of Directors of AHFSA to discuss the problems 
with complaint investigations and stress the urgency of improving all enforce-
ment efforts. In addition, HCF A also: 
• directed all [s]tate survey agencies to investi-
gate any complaint alleging harm to a resident 
within 10 working days; 
• reiterated to [s]tates that complaints alleging 
immediate jeopardy to residents must be inves-
tigated within two days; 
• stressed to [ s ]tates that they must enter com-
plaint information into [the HCFA] data sys-
tem [OSCAR] promptly; 
• published a regulation ... allowing [s]tates to 
impose fines for each instance of a violation; 
and 
• [began having HCFA] [r]egional [o]ffice staff 
conduct surveys to verify nursing home resi-
dent complaints when necessary.I 2I 
Moreover, HCF A initiated a Complaint Improvement Project "to identify key 
elements of the complaint process, address resident and consumer concerns 
117. Nursing Home Complaint Investigation: Hearing Before the S. Select Comm. on Ag-
ing, 106th Cong. (1999), available at www.cms.hhs.gov/apps/media/press/release.asp?Counter 
=571 (statement of Mike Hash, Deputy Adm'r Health Care Financing Admin.) [hereinafter 
Hash, Hearing Testimony]. 
118. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTfNG OFFICE, PUB. No. GAO/HEHS-99-80, COMPLAINT 
INVESTIGATION PROCESSES OFTEN INADEQUATE TO PROTECT RESIDENTS 16-1 7 (1999), 
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/he99080.pdf. 
119. Jd. 
120. DHHS, OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL, PUB. No. OEI-01-04-00340, NURSfNG HOME 
COMPLAINT INVESTIGATIONS I (2006), http://oig.hhs.gov/oei/reports/oei-0 l-04-00340.pdf(here-
inafter 2006 OIG NURSfNG HOME COMPLAfNT REPORT] (citing Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 
1395i- 3(g)(4)(A)-(g)(5)(a) (2003)). 
121. Hash, Hearing Testimony, supra note 117. 
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about the process, and develop standards for prioritizing complaints and deter-
mining appropriate time frames for investigations. " 122 In testimony at a hearing 
before the Senate Special Committee on Aging, then Deputy Administrator of 
HCF A, Mike Hash, stated that HCF A had determined that the key elements of 
the complaint process included: 
• informing consumers of their right to make 
complaints and how to do so; 
• the complaint intake process, including how 
complaints are received, classified and sched-
uled for investigation; 
• the investigation process, including the train-
ing, knowledge, attitudes, and case load of in-
vestigators; 
• the resolution process, for determining wheth-
er a complaint is substantiated; 
• the administrative hearing process, including 
back-log of cases; 
• the compliance or response process for ad-
dressing substantiated complaints, including 
the range and actual use of remedies and back-
log of actions; and, 
• interactions between complaint investigations 
and licensure and certification systems, the le-
gal system, and facility-level grievance or con-
tinuous quality improvement processes. 123 
Based on information received from the Complaint Improvement Project, Hash 
stated that HCFA would "develop [t]ederal minimum standards and produce a 
manual for States describing each element of a model complaint investigation 
process, how [ s ]tates should implement the process, and necessary training and 
staffing levels."124 Furthermore, Hash stated that HCFA would "specifically 
evaluate how well [s]tates respond to consumer complaints and how promptly 
and thoroughly they report investigation results to [HCF A] to determine wheth-
er they meet their survey responsibilities."125 
In October 2000, CMS established the State Performance Standard Re-
views which set performance standards for state survey agencies. These annual 
reviews "serve as CMS's primary oversight mechanism" for state agency per-
formance in responding to complaints. 126 The 2002 performance standards, for 
122. /d. 
123. /d. 
124. /d. 
125. /d. 
126. See 2006 OIG NURSING HOME COMPLAINT REPORT, supra note 120, at 3. 
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example, required that"[ s ]tate agenc[ies] triage[] and initiate[] investigation of 
100 percent of the complaints [they] receive[] alleging or involving actual harm 
(high) to individuals consistent with CMS and [s]tate policy." 127 
A GAO Report released in 2005 indicated that CMS oversight of state 
survey activities had improved. 128 However, the report recommended that CMS 
"[ f]inalize the development of guidance to states for their complaint investiga-
tion processes and ensure that [the guidance] address[] key weaknesses, includ-
ing the prioritization of complaints for investigation .... " 129 
2. Characteristics of the Current Complaint Process 
Over the last few years, CMS did two things to improve its oversight of 
state agency response to complaints. In 2004, CMS implemented the Aspen 
Complaints Incident Tracking System (ACTS) to standardize reported com-
plaints, allowing analysis across state survey agencies and the ability to evaluate 
state complaint investigations. 130 In March 2006, 131 CMS formalized its state 
guidance for complaint investigation processes, incorporating its recommenda-
tions (Management of Complaints and Incidents) into the State Operations Ma-
nual ("SOM"). 132 The procedures are to be followed when complaints and 
reported incidents involve Medicare or Medicaid certified providers or suppli-
ers. 
The SOM acknowledges that complaints133 or related information can 
come from beneficiaries, their families, health care providers, citizens, public 
127. !d. at 15 . 
128. See U.S. Gov 'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, PUB. No. GA0-06-117, NURSING HOMES: 
DESPITE INCREASED OVERSIGHT, CHALLENGES REMAIN IN ENSURING HIGH QUALITY CARE AND 
RESIDENT SAFETY (2005), http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d06117 .pdf [hereinafter 2005 GAO 
REPORT]. In November 2002, CMS also initiated the Nursing Home Quality Improvement Ini-
tiative in an effort to, among other things, increase oversight over quality initiatives of state 
survey agencies and QIOs and to foster and improve communication between these agencies, as 
well as independent health quality organizations, advocates and nursing home providers. Hash, 
Hearing Testimony, supra note 117. 
129. 2005 GAO REPORT, supra note 128, at 52. 
130. See 2006 OIG NURSING HOME COMPLAINT REPORT, supra note 120, at i. The ACTS 
"includes more comprehensive complaint information than the previous repository for nation-
wide complaint data, the Online Survey Certification and Reporting system ("OSCAR")." !d. 
131. CMS, Transmittal 18 (2006), http://www.cms.hhs.gov/transmittals/downloads/ 
Rl8SOMA.pdf. 
132. CMS, STATE OPERATIONS MANUAL (2006), Chapter 5, http://www.cms.hhs.gov 
/manuals/downloads/som1 07c05 .pdf[hereinafter SOM]. "As part ofthe agreements with CMS 
under which State survey agencies operate, SOM requirements are contractually binding on 
Medicare-certified and Medicare-Medicaid dually certified nursing homes." 2006 OIG 
NURSING HOME COMPLAINT REPORT, supra note 120, at 1. 
133. The SOM defines a complaint as an "allegation of noncompliance with Federal and/or 
State requirements" (SOM, supra note 132, § 50 10), and states that "complaints that are not 
directly related to federal requirements" may be forwarded to the "appropriate agency(ies) for 
follow-up and investigation." Such complaints may include allegations of"Medicare/Medicaid 
fraud, complaints against individual licensed practitioners, and billing issues." !d. § 5000. 1. 
Complaints alleging non condition-level noncompliance may be referred to the relevant accred-
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agencies, or media reports and that after a complaint is received subsequent 
communication with the complainant may be necessary in order to evaluate and 
prioritize the complaint. The SOM provides a list of intake information that 
state survey agencies should collect in the initial or follow up contact with the 
complainant. This information includes: 
• the complainant's name, address, telephone, 
etc.; 
• the individuals involved and affected; 
• the narrative and specifics of the complainant's 
concerns including the date, and time of the al-
legation; 
• the complainant's views about the frequency 
and pervasiveness of the allegation; 
• the name of the provider/supplier including lo-
cation (e.g., unit, room, floor) ofthe allegation, 
if applicable; 
• how/why the complainant believes the alleged 
event occurred; 
• whether the complainant initiated other courses 
of action, such as reporting to other agencies, 
discussing issues with the provider, and obtain-
ing a response/resolution; and 
• the complainant's expectation/desire for resolu-
tion/remedy, if appropriate. 134 
As part of the intake process, the survey agency ("SA") is to provide the com-
plainant with the following: 
• the policies and procedures for handling in-
takes including the scope of the SA's regula-
tory authority and any considerations 
pertaining to confidentiality; 
• the course of action that the SA or R0135 will 
take and the anticipated time frames; 
• information about other appropriate agencies 
that could provide assistance including the 
iting organization. /d.§ 5010.2. 
134. /d. § 5010.1. 
135. RO refers to the CMS Regional Office. The SOM provides that the SA must forward 
certain allegations to the CMS Regional Office. CMS ROs are "responsible for monitoring the 
SAs' management of complaints and incidents to assure that the SAs are complying with the 
provisions set forth in [t]ederal regulations, the SOM, and CMS policy memoranda." !d. § 
5050. 
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name and telephone number of a contact per-
son, if available; and 
• an SA contact name and number for follow-up 
by the complainant. 136 
33 
SAs are expected to input all complaint data from initial intake and inves-
tigation through final disposition into ACTS. "[D]ata entered into ACTS is 
subject to [f]ederallaws governing disclosure and the protection of an individ-
ual 's right to privacy. " 137 
The SOM includes maximum time frames for SAs to initiate investiga-
tions in response to complaints of immediate jeopardy and complaints regarding 
a high or medium probability of harm at nursing homes, non-deemed providers 
other than nursing homes, and deemed providers. 138 
The SOM further provides guidance to SAs in responding to complain-
ants. Such responses generally should include: 
• acknowledgement of the complainant's con-
cerns; 
• a statement of the SA's regulatory authority to 
investigate the complaint and any statutory or 
regulatory limits that may bear on its authority 
to conduct an investigation; 
• a summary of the SA's investigation methods 
(e.g, on-site visit, written correspondence, tel-
ephone inquiries, etc.); 
• date(s) of investigation; 
• an explanation of the SA's decision-making 
process including definitions of terms used; 
• a summary of the SA's finding; 139 
• a description of follow-up action, if any, to be 
taken by the SA (e.g., follow-up visit, plan of 
correction review, no further action, etc.); and 
• appropriate referral information (i .e., other 
agencies that may be involved). 140 
136. /d. § 50 I 0.2. The QIO Manual requires that similar information be provided in the 
initial follow-up letters to complainants. See CMS, QIO MANUAL, supra note 37, § 5010. 
137. SOM, supra note 132, § 5060. 
138. /d. § 5070. An organization is considered "deemed" when a national accrediting 
commission, such as the Joint Commission, provides CMS with verification that the organiza-
tion meets or exceeds appropriate federal requirements. A "deemed" organization therefore is 
deemed to meet Medicare (or Medicaid) certification requirements. 
139. "The summary should not compromise the anonymity of individuals, or include spe-
cific situations that may be used to identify individuals, when anonymity has been requested or 
is appropriate in the judgment of the SA." /d. § 5080.1. 
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Although this guidance is relatively new, a July 2006 OIG report provides some 
information about the compliance of state SAs with the State Performance 
Standards and the SOM provisions in responding to complaints about nursing 
homes. Significant findings from the OIG included the following: 
• "State agencies did not investigate some of the 
most serious nursing home complaints within 
SOM-required timeframes." In 2004, based 
on the State Performance Standard Reviews, 
SAs did not investigate seven percent of com-
plaints alleging "immediate jeopardy" in the 
required forty-eight hours. 141 In addition, SAs 
did not investigate twenty-seven percent of 
complaints alleging actual harm within there-
quired ten day timeframe. 142 
• State agencies have not taken full advantage of 
the ACTS. SAs' "use of their own data sys-
tems in addition to the ACTS, technical prob-
lems with the ACTS, and lack of training have 
hindered its use as a complaint management 
tool."l43 
• "Most state agencies' written policies and pro-
cedures generally incorporate the SOM; how-
140. !d. The SOM recognizes that many states have separate procedures specifying how 
SAs should respond to and manage complaints. According to CMS, "[w]henever possible, 
[s]tate and [f]ederal requirements should be integrated to avoid unnecessary duplication." !d.§ 
5050. 
141. 2006 OIG NURSING HOME COMPLAINT REPORT, supra note 120, at 8. 
142. !d. at 9. State Performance Standards for 2004 included the following: 
!d. at 3-4. 
• "For ninety percent of randomly selected complaints, the CMS 
regional office must agree with the state agency's prioritization 
of the complaint;" 
• "The [s]tate agency must investigate all immediate jeopardy 
complaints onsite within two working days;" 
• "The [s]tate agency must investigate all complaints alleging ac-
tual harm (high) onsite in an average often working days, with 
all investigations completed within twenty working days;" 
• "The [s]tate agency must follow CMS instructions for handling 
complaints for no less than eighty percent of nursing home com-
plaints. These instructions include contacting complainants with 
investigation results and having qualified surveyors complete the 
nursing home survey, among others." 
143. !d. at ii. 
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ever, those policies do not incorporate all of 
the SOM's guidelines." 144 
• "[M]any follow-up letters to complainants 
lacked meaningful information." 145 Although 
SAs appeared to do a good job sending out 
some kind of response to complainants, there-
sponses "often lacked comprehensive informa-
tion about the complaints such as 
acknowledging the complainant's concern and 
summarizing the investigation methods." 
• "CMS oversight of nursing home complaint 
investigations is limited." 146 
35 
With respect to each of these measures, state performance varies signifi-
cantly from state to state. 147 A significant majority of states, for example, 
scored well on timeliness in responding to complaints of immediate jeopardy, 
responding to at least ninety percent of such complaints within the two-day 
window. Yet, ten states failed to respond in the required timeframe between 
ten and thirty-three percent of the time, and one state failed to respond in a 
timely manner in over ninety percent of cases alleging immediate jeopardy.148 
The inability of states to respond within the required time frames may be attrib-
uted to insufficient agency staffing-both in terms of number of staff and staff 
competence to evaluate complaints. Moreover, a consistent concern across 
state agencies is a lack of adequate resources to respond to complaints in a 
timely manner. 
Regarding SA responses to complaints, the OIG found that"[ w ]hile most 
of the [s]tate agencies' policies direct their staff to send follow-up letters to 
complainants, many of the policies provide little or no detail about the required 
content of [the] letters. " 149 Of the forty-two policies reviewed by the OIG, "on-
ly [nine] require[ d) that follow-up letters to complainants include all of the 
components cited in the SOM." 150 
The OIG reviewed 498 nursing home complaints that resulted in an onsite 
investigation. The review indicated that state agencies "generally collected ap-
propriate information during intake, employed qualified professionals to assign 
priorities to the complaints, and provided the complainant . .. with a written 
report of the investigation findings ." 151 Agencies tended to fall short when in-
144. !d. 
145. !d. 
146. /d. 
147. See id. at 28 tbl.4. 
148. See id. 
149. /d. at 13 . 
150. /d. 
151. !d. 
36 INDIANA H EALTH LAW REVIEW [Vol. 5:9 
corporating each of the elements listed by the SOM for inclusion in the re-
sponse to complainants.152 
In a letter to the OIG regarding its findings , then-CMS Administrator 
Mark McClellan pointed out that the number of completed nursing home com-
plaint investigations undertaken by state agencies rose by thirty-seven percent 
from 1999 to 2005 (from 32,422 to 44,677). The increase, according to 
McClellan, "represents both stronger performance and stronger commitment to 
be as responsive as possible to nursing home residents and their families." 153 
While state agencies vary considerably with regard to their responsiveness 
to complaints, there are indications that many states are doing a competent job 
and have systems in place to effectively track complaints and responses. Al-
though many states continue to struggle with inadequate staffing, a number of 
states have significantly improved their complaint responses over the last two to 
three years due to federal requirements. 
Although there is no uniform national data available on how often state 
survey agencies implement various types of corrective actions or sanctions un-
der state laws, these agencies have a range of interventions available to them 
with which to respond to findings that a facility is providing poor quality care. 
In addition to issuing letters of deficiency and requiring corrective action, agen-
cies may levy civil monetary penalties or revoke a facility ' s license. While SAs 
rarely do the latter, they routinely require corrective action plans and follow up 
with providers to ensure that action is taken. SAs also provide due process pro-
tections to providers when levying fines or revoking a license; such protections 
include an appeal process for providers who contest these actions. In addition, 
federal rules require that SAs provide an informal dispute resolution process for 
nursing homes contesting citations for deficiencies.154 
While SAs generally excel in tracking and responding to beneficiary com-
plaints, a major shortcoming of relying solely on SAs to perform the beneficiary 
review function is that their scope of authority is limited to institutional provid-
ers. In determining whether relying on SAs to respond to Medicare beneficiary 
complaints is appropriate, it would be helpful to know the percentage of com-
plaints received by QIOs that address institutional care. One might also argue 
that health care institutions have significant control over physician practices and 
152. See id. at 14 tbl.3 (summarizing the OIG' s findings on this performance measure). 
According to the table, letters were missing acknowledgement of the complainant's concerns 
forty-seven percent of the time, a summary of the investigation methods fifty percent of the time, 
a discussion of the SA' s decision making process twenty-seven percent of the time, and the 
summary of the SA' s findings nine percent of the time. /d. 
153. See id. at 29 app. C (Letter from Mark B. McClellan, Administrator, CMS, to Daniel 
R. Levinson, Inspector General, DHHS (May 17, 2006) (responding to OIG Draft Report Nurs-
ing Home Complaint Investigations (OEI-0 1-04-00340)). 
154. 42 CFR § 488 .331 and Chapter 7, Survey and Enforcement Process. For non-federal 
surveys, the state must offer a facility an informal opportunity, at the facility's request, to dispute 
survey findings upon the facility's receipt of the official statement of deficiencies. For federal 
surveys, CMS offers a facility an informal opportunity, at the facility's request, to dispute survey 
findings upon the facility's receipt of the official statement of deficiencies. /d. 
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other health care providers, and therefore, SAs, by effectuating changes in insti-
tutional practices, might be an effective vehicle for influencing practitioner be-
havior. 
B. State Medical Boards 
The OIG also mentioned state medical boards as possible entities to take 
on the review of Medicare beneficiary complaints about quality of care. 155 In 
this section we describe the scope and activity of these boards and their re-
sponse to consumer complaints involving physician practices. 
Legislatures in every state have enacted a Medical Practice Act that de-
fines the proper practice of medicine and the medical board's scope of respon-
sibility to regulate that practice within the state. 156 Most states have separate 
boards for each medical specialty. State medical boards license providers, in-
vestigate complaints, discipline those who violate the law, conduct provider 
evaluations and facilitate rehabilitation of providers when appropriate. The 
basis for discipline does not vary significantly across the states, with most states 
including "incompetence; gross negligence; aiding and abetting the unlicensed 
practice of medicine; conviction of a felony or other crime ... ; unlawful sale of 
drugs; impairment due to drugs or alcohol; and professional discipline in an-
other state . . . " 157 State medical boards judge the potential offenses that come 
before them under one of two different standards. Nationally, about two-thirds 
of state medical boards use a "preponderance standard" and one-third use the 
higher "clear and convincing evidence" standard. 158 
State medical boards routinely receive complaints about provider behavior 
and practice and are a potential vehicle to receive Medicare beneficiary com-
plaints regarding substandard care. Because physicians (unlike other health 
care providers) generally work independently and are not directly disciplined by 
the facilities in which they practice, our focus will be on physician boards. 159 
155 . 2001 OIG REPORT, supra note 2, at iii . 
156. The Tenth Amendment ofthe United States Constitution authorizes this legislation, 
which allows States to establish laws and regulations protecting the health, safety, and general 
welfare of their citizens. See U.S. CONST. amend. X. 
157. FURROW ET AL., supra note 14, at 82. 
158. See 2006 DHHS BoARD STUDY, supra note 69, at 14-15. Under a "preponderance of 
the evidence" standard, a board may make a disciplinary finding from a mere preponderance of 
the evidence, that is, that an offense more likely than not occurred. !d. Under a "clear and con-
vincing evidence" standard, a board may make a disciplinary finding only if the board finds that 
there is little doubt that the offense took place. 
159. Arguably, complaints involving the large majority of other health professionals could 
be addressed by working through health care institutions. Some would argue that institutions, at 
least hospitals, also have considerable control over physicians via the granting of practice privi-
leges. Certain specialists are very dependent on hospital privileges, and while hospitals may be 
reluctant to take away privileges from physicians and thereby lose referral volume, recent com-
mentaries have encouraged hospitals to adopt a more central role in controll ing physician prac-
tices. See Lucian L. Leape & John A. Fromson, Problem Doctors: Is There a System-Level 
Solution? 144 ANNALS INTERNAL M ED. I 07, 107 (2006). 
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The structure and authority of state medical boards vary from state to 
state. Some boards are independent and maintain all licensing and disciplinary 
powers; whereas others are part of a larger umbrella agency, such as a state de-
partment of health. State medical boards are typically made up of volunteer 
physicians and members ofthe public who, in most cases, are appointed by the 
governor and paid a nominal stipend for their service. The criticism that boards 
are "captured" by the profession has received a great deal of attention in the 
past decade and now, almost every state requires that its board include some 
number of lay members, on the theory that they are more likely to hold errant 
physicians accountable. 160 
The majority of state medical boards typically employ an administrative 
staff including an executive officer, attorneys, investigators, and licensing per-
sonnel. The state legislature determines the financial resources of most boards. 
Some boards are funded directly from physician licensing and registration fees. 
Board spending per thousand physicians ranges widely and is primarily af-
fected by licensure fee levels and state budgetary policies. A 2006 DHHS 
study of state medical boards reported the need for increased budgets to im-
prove their complaint processes. 161 This report further noted that"[ n ]ationally 
the best funded 25% of Boards receive more than double the resources per in-
state practicing physician as their lower funded counterparts in the bottom 
25%."162 
While state medical boards play a vital role in the realm of medical com-
plaints, there are significant differences between the fifty-one boards that exist 
across the country. 163 Most importantly, not all state medical boards investigate 
complaints. 164 In seven states, this duty is delegated to another agency, most 
commonly the state's health department. 165 Another important difference be-
tween boards is their degree of independence from state agencies. 166 While 
most state medical boards are independent, a good number are semi-
160. See 2006 DHHS BOARD STUDY, supra note 69, at II. 
161. See id. at ix. 
162. Jd. at 16. 
163. A large part of the information relating to the nation's medical boards in this paper 
comes from the Federation of State Medical Boards' 2003 Exchange, a compendium of informa-
tion about state medical boards published every two to four years. See FEDERATION OF STATE 
MEDICAL BOARDS, EXCHANGE tbl.29 (2003) (hereinafter FSMB EXCHANGE]. The Exchange is 
based on surveys completed by the medical boards that comprise the Federation of State Medi-
cal Boards ("FSMB"). The FSMB is a national not-for-profit organization representing the 
seventy medical boards of the United States and its territories, including fourteen state boards of 
osteopathic medicine. For purposes of this paper, we include information relating to the medi-
cal boards in the fifty U.S. states and the District of Columbia. It should be noted that three 
Boards (Vermont, New Jersey, and South Dakota) did not respond to the FSMB survey. In 
addition, New York has two boards- an advisory board and a professional conduct board. We 
consider them together for purposes of this report . 
164. Jd. at tbl.29. 
165. See id. at tbls.5 & 8. These states include Arkansas, Connecticut, Florida, Hawaii, 
Michigan, Nebraska, New York, and Utah. 
166. See id. at tbl.8 . 
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independent (generally part of the state's health department) and some are pure-
ly advisory. 
Like the QIOs, all fifty-one state medical boards have a website available 
to the public, which vary in terms of their usefulness to patients. 167 Public Citi-
zen168 has analyzed the "user-friendliness" of the fifty-one board websites, 169 
specifically with regard to online physician profiles, and found huge differences 
between states. 170 Beyond a website, boards also vary greatly in terms of acces-
sibility. More than half publish a public newsletter, while less than half have a 
toll-free number available to the general public. 171 State medical boards also 
vary as to whether they assure confidentiality to those who report violations. 172 
On two basic measures, most state medical boards are responsive to com-
plainants: forty-eight of the fifty-one boards acknowledge complaints made to 
them173 and forty-nine boards inform complainants of the outcome of the com-
plaint. 174 Unlike the QIOs, which are currently forbidden by CMS from reveal-
ing individual practitioner information without the practitioner's permission, 
most state medical boards inform complainants of the outcome of an investiga-
tion.175 
Virtually all boards have experience conducting investigations, specifi-
cally in response to health care quality complaints. Although state medical 
boards are generally staffed by practitioners, the 2006 DHHS Report found that 
many boards have difficulty obtaining sufficient medical and legal expertise at 
both the complaint screening stages and in preparing for and conducting formal 
testimony at hearings. 176 
Speed of complaint resolution varies greatly by state. In the typical state, 
about ten percent of cases take more than 360 days to resolve. 177 According to 
the 2006 DHHS Board Study, "[c]losure times vary considerably according to 
167. See id. at tb1.16. 
168. Public Citizen is a Washington D .C.-based consumer advocacy organization founded 
in 1971 by Ralph Nadar. 
169. Meredith Larson et al., PUBLIC CITIZEN'S HEALTH RESEARCH GROUP, Pub. No . 1791, 
REPORT OF DOCTOR DISCIPLINARY INFORMATION ON STATE WEB SITES: A SURVEY AND RANKING 
OF STATE MEDICAL AND OSTEOPATHIC BOARD WEB SITES, at A-12 tbl.7 (2006), 
http://www.citizen.org/documents/ I 791 MedBoard2006FuliReportWeb.pdf. 
170. !d. at 18. Physician profiles are legislatively mandated in most of the states that did 
well in the survey and not mandated in states that did poorly in the survey. !d. at 19. In this 
study, Public Citizen evaluated the websites based on the following criteria: availability and 
types of physician-identifying information; state board disciplinary action information; hospital 
disciplinary action information; federal government disciplinary action information; malpractice 
and conviction information; and user-friendliness. !d. at 5-6. According to the evaluation, New 
Jersey hosts the most user-friendly website and North Dakota hosts the least user-friendly. !d. 
171. See FSMB EXCHANGE, supra note 163, at tbl.l6. 
172. !d. at tbl.l8. 
173. !d. at tb1.35. Florida, Indiana, and Utah are the exceptions. 
174. !d. Indiana and Utah are the exceptions. 
175. !d. 
176. See 2006 DHHS BOARD STUDY, supra note 69, at vii. 
177. /d. 
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how far through the disciplinary process a case proceeds. Nationally, in 2003, 
cases resolved before or during investigation averaged 180 days from intake to 
closure, 425 days for cases closed after investigation but before hearing, and 
6 7 5 days to reach hearing." 178 Furthermore, all of the states in the study re-
ported a backlog in cases.179 
Unlike QIOs, all state medical boards have broad disciplinary decision-
making ability that they routinely employ. 180 The following table lists the most 
common board sanctions and the percentage of states in which they are avail-
able. 
. \\ailahilit~ of Sanctions 
(pcrccntaj.!l' of states" ith sanctions) 
100% 
100% 
100% 
98% 
Summary suspension 96% 
license 
Public 94% 
Collection of fine 87% 
Letter of Concern 64% 
Collection of costs of pro- 55% 
Letter/decree of censure 49% 
Private reprimand 
SOURCE: 2006 DHHS Board 
178. !d. at 32. 
179. !d. at 35. 
180. See FSMB EXCHANGE, supra note 163, at tbl.39. 
181. 2006 OHHS B OARD STUDY, supra note 69, at 29 exh. l6. 
100% 
100% 
100% 
100% 
100% 
100% 
100% 
33% 
50% 
67% 
17% 
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Some boards also utilize more creative remedies, such as mentoring or 
supervision of provider practices, mandatory education programs, limitations on 
practice, e.g., prescribing. All state medical boards that conduct investigations 
and engage in disciplinary actions have administrative due process procedures 
to protect providers. Many boards rely on State Attorney Generals' offices for 
legal representation in disciplinary cases.182 
As set forth in the medical practice acts in most states, quality of care is 
the guiding principle behind the state medical boards' role in licensure and dis-
cipline. However, many boards in the 2006 DHHS Report commented that the 
complaint process is reactive, and they would prefer to engage in more proac-
tive quality improvement activities.183 In that report, state medical boards ad-
mitted they are driven by consumer complaints and these complaints result in a 
large number of costly investigations that lead to few actionable ca~es. 1 84 
The amount of information released to the public regarding investigations 
and sanctions varies widely among the states. Thirty-three out of fifty-one state 
medical boards issue an annual report that is available to the public and me-
dia.1 85 Additionally, the information in these reports varies greatly. 186 The in-
formation states release to the public about physicians licensed in that state also 
differs, although most (forty-nine) reveal physicians' disciplinary history. 187 
State medical boards, however, have come under greater pressure in recent 
years to release more information to the public. As a result, many states have 
passed laws requiring increased disclosure, especially regarding physician pro-
files. Iss 
The most salient characteristic of state medical boards (and most problem-
atic for giving boards responsibility to respond to Medicare beneficiary com-
plaints) is that they are wholly creatures of state law. The federal government 
has no power to influence state medical boards to coordinate activities, make 
reports, or harmonize their activities to fit into a national framework, regardless 
of whether a board functions independently within a state or as part of the 
state's health department. For example, the federal law creating the National 
Practitioner Data Bank189 "requires" boards to report certain adverse actions 
taken against physicians to a national data bank. 190 Although the word "re-
182. See FSMB EXCHANGE, supra note 163, at tb1.39. 
183 . See 2006 DHHS BoARD STUDY, supra note 69, at 44-45 . 
184. !d. The DHHS Board Study found that many board members and managers wanted 
to do more for safety than simply reacting to complaints. Some suggested other proactive alter-
natives to complaint-based discipline, including audits of physician practices, non-disciplinary 
use of clinical assessment centers, and efforts to encourage ongoing maintenance of competen-
cies. !d. at 65 . 
185. See FSMB EXCHANGE, supra note 163, at tbl.6. 
186. ld. 
187. Jd. at tbls.40 & 43. Louisiana and Wyoming are the exceptions. 
188. See LARSON ET AL., supra note 169, at 3. 
189. See Health Care Quality Improvement Act of 1986, Title IV ofPub. L. 99-660, I 00 
Stat. 3784 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ IIIOI-lll52). 
190. See 42 U.S.C. § 11133 (2000). 
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quire" is used throughout the statute and regulations, if a board refuses to 
transmit the information specified under the law, CMS can only designate an-
other qualified entity to report such information. 191 
C. Combined Entity Including State Survey Agency and 
State Medical Board 
Given that state survey agencies are limited to dealing only with facility-
based complaints and that medical boards are authorized to deal only with indi-
vidual provider-based complaints, an alternative entity that combines the exper-
tise of State Survey agencies and State Medical Boards in responding to 
beneficiary complaints but also relies on QIOs for analyzing the complaints 
received by these two entities may provide the most effective way to respond to 
beneficiary complaints. 
A major problem with the current system is duplication of effort and fail-
ure of coordination among various entities responding to complaints about poor 
quality health care. Complaints are potentially received by a number of agen-
cies, including the SAs, the state medical and other health professional boards, 
QIOs, the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Health Care Organizations 
(the "Joint Commission), the Nursing Home Ombudsman, and Medicare con-
tractors. There appears to be little, if any, coordination or sharing of informa-
tion regarding complaints among these agencies. 
We were surprised to learn that many directors of SAs did not know that 
QIOs received beneficiary complaints. As compared to SAs and state medical 
boards, the QIOs receive significantly fewer complaints. One of the state direc-
tors with whom we spoke said he was unaware that the QIO in his state re-
ceived beneficiary complaints. After he learned, from our inquiry, that this 
occurred, he called his state QIO and asked about the beneficiary complaint 
process and how many complaints the QIO had received in the previous year. 
The QIO staff person said the QIO had received 100 complaints. The SA Di-
rector thought this was somewhat comical as his state office receives approxi-
mately 100 complaints in half a day. Clearly, it is the case that the QIOs do not 
necessarily share their complaints with the state survey agencies. This is de-
spite the fact that some sharing of information is envisioned by the QIO Man-
ual.1 92 Without a complete picture of the types of complaints that are being 
191. See 45 C.F.R. § 60.8(a) (2006). 
192. According to the QJO Manual : 
The State health agency or other appropriate State or local agency used by 
CMS to perform survey/certification and review functions for Medicare 
(the "SA") is not required to refer all complaints to [the QIO] that involve 
quality issues. In some States, it is the law that the SA reviews all com-
plaints it receives. To assist [the QIO] and the SA in understanding [the 
QIO' s] areas of responsibility, [the QIO should] develop a written plan 
with the SA that explains the types of complaints each will be responsible 
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made by consumers about health care institutions and providers, it is difficult 
for QIOs or any quality improvement organization to make or recommend mod-
ifications to a system to improve quality and patient safety. An alternative sys-
tem that would require coordination among existing agencies and increase the 
complaint data going to QIOs is described below. 
1. Elements of an Alternative Complaint Entity 
I . SAs and state medical boards would be designated as the official 
place for a Medicare beneficiary to lodge a complaint about quality of 
care received. (Complaints about non-physician health care provid-
ers, e.g., nurses, therapists, etc., who typically provide care in an insti-
tutional setting, would be handled by the SA.) This may or may not 
increase the number of complaints these agencies receive. It may also 
require the state agencies to have a broader scope of complaints over 
which they have authority to respond, e.g., complaints that are not 
violations of state licensing standards but meet the review require-
ment standards for Medicare beneficiary complaints. 
2. SAs and state medical boards would investigate all formal complaints, 
determine if there is a deficiency in the care provided or an issue re-
garding quality of care, determine what type of corrective action is 
necessary, and work with the institution and/or provider to implement 
such corrective actions or impose civil monetary penalties or other 
form of sanctions as appropriate. 
3. These agencies would provide individualized responses to complain-
ants via letter, which would include the agencies ' findings and any ac-
tion taken. 
4. In order to attain some standardization in response practices and con-
sistency across jurisdictions, CMS would put in place guidelines for 
responding to such complaints, similar to those already in place for 
SAs in the CMS state operations manual. CMS would also monitor 
performance, as it currently does over certain aspects of SA perform-
ance. 
5. State agencies would receive additional funding for these new tasks. 
6. Each state would designate an individual within the relevant depart-
ment (health, consumer, etc.) to oversee this process and attempt to 
coordinate efforts of the SA and the professional licensing boards 
when a complaint involving multiple providers is received. 
for reviewing, and the exchange of information involving deficiencies in 
survey and certification requirements or confirmed quality concerns. [The 
QIO should] involve [the QIO's] Regional Office Project Officer when [the 
QIO] and the SA cannot agree on what types of issues each should review 
or when there are multiple issues that require Project Office coordina-
tion/assistance." 
CMS, QIO MANUAL, supra note 37, § 5015. 
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7. The state agencies would forward all complaints and follow up action 
taken to the State QIO. 
8. Ideally, other agencies such as the Joint Commission and Medicare 
contractors would also be required to submit complaints to the QIO. 
9. The QIOs would respond to requests from SAs and the medical 
boards for technical assistance, use information about complaints to 
identify priorities for technical assistance, and work with institutions 
and providers to implement the necessary changes. 
10. QIOs would share complaint information with the relevant CMS re-
gional office. This would ensure that the appropriate regional offices 
have the relevant information and can feed that information back to 
the relevant local QIOs. The regional offices would also have the au-
thority to consider referral to the OIG for sanctions in cases where the 
state agencies decide not to sanction or to administer additional sanc-
tions beyond those meted out by the state agencies. 
11. QIOs would post uniform data about complaints received by the state 
entities on their websites so that it would be available to the public. 
This could take the form of an annual quality report. 
12. Regional offices would submit all information to a national database. 
The analysis of data at a national level, using expert panels, is likely 
to be more effective in identifying quality improvement priorities na-
tionally and regionally. This database would have a structure and 
classification/nomenclature that would create standardization, allow 
data analysis for safety/QI and facilitate public reporting. It could 
also be designed to track timeliness and even include beneficiary sat-
isfaction data. Identified priorities could also be shared with local 
QIOs for implementation. 
This alternative is consistent with the recommendation of the 10M to shift 
the review of beneficiary complaints from the QIOs to other entities. 193 The 
10M report argued that this shift should be made for a number of reasons. For 
example, it would allow QIOs to focus on quality improvement and perform-
ance measurement which are " incompatible with a strong regulatory func-
tion."194 Moreover, the report points to the small number of complaints 
received by QIOs. 195 Finally, the 10M argues that there are a number of other 
organizations already responding to consumer complaints and some of them 
have greater visibility among consumers than the QIOs. The report specifically 
states that"[ a ]mong the entities considered should be state health departments 
and the state Survey and Certification agencies, which already contract with 
193. See 2006 IOM R EPORT, supra note 3, at 113 . 
194. !d. 
195. See id. 
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CMS to conduct certain functions for the Medicare program, including the re-
view of all quality-related complaints for nursing homes."196 
2. Assessment of Alternative Complaint Entity 
In evaluating this alternative to QIO for receiving and responding to 
Medicare beneficiary complaints we used two sets of criteria. The first are 
those which the OIG called in its 2001 report the "characteristics of an effec-
tive complaint process." 197 They include accessibility, investigative capac-
ity, interventions and follow-through, quality improvement orientation, 
responsiveness, timeliness, objectivity, and public accountability. 198 In addi-
tion to these characteristics identified by the OIG, we added scope of author-
ity, adequate resources, coordination with other entities, due process (i.e., 
fairness to the provider), consistency across jurisdictions, and range of re-
sponses/remedies (apology, mediation, quality improvement, compensation, 
sanctions, etc.) to the list of "effectiveness criteria."199 
The combined entity, would fare well on many (though not all) of the cri-
teria relevant for evaluation of a complaint system. Below, we assess the alter-
native entity on each of the listed criteria as compared to the QIOs. 
Accessibility: SAs and state medical boards are much more accessible 
than QIOs and they already receive a much larger volume of complaints than 
QIOs. Consumers and beneficiaries are most likely to lodge a complaint with 
SAs and state medical boards. SAs are required to have hotlines to receive 
complaints concerning nursing homes and home health care. We found that 
states may also have hotlines for other facilities, such as hospitals. 
Investigative Capacity: SAs employ individuals with health care exper-
tise to survey health care facilities. Most often, these individuals are nurses 
trained by CMS and the states. Additional medical expertise may be obtained 
from the state medical board. A few state medical boards already contract with 
their QIOs for additional medical expertise. A closer nexus between state 
agencies and QIOs regarding complaint activity could facilitate this consulta-
tion process. Survey agencies have rapid access to clinical records and broad 
investigative authority. 
Interventions and Follow Through: SAs and medical boards have many 
more tools at their disposal than QIOs to intervene to take corrective action in 
196. !d. at 115. 
197. 2001 OIG Report, supra note 2, at 6. 
198. !d. Appendix A, infra, includes a description of each of the criteria identified in the 
2001 OIG Report. 
199. Several of these criteria are described in more detail by a companion paper to this 
report by Peter A. Hollmann, M.D. Peter A. Hollmann, Elements and Considerations for De-
veloping a Medicare Beneficiary Complaint Process to Address Quality of Care Concerns: The 
Medical Perspective, http://www.Medicareadvocacy.org/QIOConference/Background/Back 
groundPaper.MedicalPerspective.pdf. 
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response to complaints. They routinely issue deficiency letters and request and 
monitor corrective action plans. 
Quality Improvement Orientation: The alternative arrangement would 
allow QIOs to do what they do best: identify priorities for technical assistance 
and suggest changes to improve quality of care. The volume of complaints 
generated by SAs and state medical boards would provide ample data for local, 
regional and nationwide analysis to discern patterns of poor quality care. A 
regional and national focus would also allow for a national database and a na-
tional expert panel to analyze the available data. 
Responsiveness: SAs and state boards already have systems in place for 
responding to complainants. CMS is improving its oversight of SA responsive-
ness to complaints, which will likely lead to greater responsiveness on the part 
ofSAs. If this alternative arrangement were to be put in place, CMS could ex-
pand its oversight of response to beneficiary complaints and provide guidelines 
similar to those already in place for SAs to respond to these complaints. 
Timeliness: Both QIOs and SAs have experienced problems in respond-
ing in a timely manner to complainants. SAs, however, are being scrutinized 
by CMS on this measure and pushed to improve timeliness of response. State 
medical boards are perhaps weakest on this measure, in part, because they have 
no federal timelines with which to comply. 
Objectivity: The proposed arrangement would deal with concerns that 
have been levied at QIOs regarding their perceived conflicts of interest. The 
function of SAs and state medical boards is to protect patients from harm. 
Unlike QIOs, which are required to work closely with providers to change prac-
tice patterns, SAs have a singular function, and at least theoretically, do not 
have the same conflicts that confront QIOs. In addition, SAs, in responding to 
complaints, often are able to rely on objective criteria and standards set forth in 
regulations. This is perhaps most true when investigating nursing homes which 
are heavily regulated. QIOs, in contrast, must rely on somewhat subjective 
evaluation by reviewing physicians. By distancing QIOs from the complaint 
process they would be able to continue to work closely with health care provid-
ers to make improvements in the system. SAs and Boards, however, could con-
tinue to play a strong role in enforcement without jeopardizing the quality 
improvement process. 
Public Accountability: The proposed arrangement could also be struc-
tured to allow for greater public accountability by making reports based on ag-
gregate complaint data available to the public. Expanding complaint 
information to be included in a new national database, including all Medicare 
beneficiary complaints, would also improve oversight and public accountabil-
ity. 
Scope of Authority: SAs and state medical boards have a scope of au-
thority that is at the same time both broader and narrower than QIOs. SAs, for 
example, have authority to respond to complaints from all patients and consum-
ers regarding care received at health care facilities subject to state licensure re-
quirements. On the other hand, SAs are not responsible for responding to 
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complaints regarding individual health practitioners. In contrast, state boards 
are limited to dealing with complaints about individual practitioners and do not 
address complaints about facilities. QIOs are limited to responding to com-
plaints by Medicare beneficiaries, but such complaints can be about individual 
practitioners or health care institutions. The combination of state survey agen-
cies and state medical boards would have authority over virtually all Medicare 
beneficiary complaints. 
Adequate Resources: While it is unlikely that the shift in responsibility 
would significantly increase the number of complaints that SAs or state medical 
boards currently receive, this alternative calls for additional funds to be given to 
these entities to improve their complaint response function. These funds could 
come from funds now awarded to QIOs. 
Coordination with Other Entities: One of the principal advantages of 
the proposed alternative is the formalization of coordination with other entities 
within a state. Currently, SAs handle complaints about institutional providers 
and routinely refer complaints about individual practitioners to the appropriate 
state boards; Boards handle complaints about individual providers; and QIOs 
handle a small number of complaints about both. Our proposal would ensure 
that these groups coordinate their efforts to avoid duplication or contrary ef-
forts. 
Due Process: Both state medical boards and state survey agencies have 
due process mechanisms in place to protect practitioners and providers from 
arbitrary punishment. State medical boards uniformly offer formal notice and 
appeal procedures to practitioners charged with violation oflicensing and disci-
plinary standards. State survey agencies generally have an appeals process in 
the case of fines or license revocation. The due process procedures of both 
state agencies would need to be harmonized to ensure procedures were uniform 
throughout. 
Consistency Across Jurisdictions: This may be the most significant 
weakness of this alternative proposal. Survey agencies and medical boards vary 
significantly from state to state, possibly more so than QIOs, which operate 
under contracts that conform to a national "scope of work" developed by CMS. 
These variations are likely due to variations in resources and expertise. To 
some extent, additional resources may help to bring those agencies operating 
below performance expectations up to applicable standards. In recognition, 
however, of the possibility that some state agencies may not reach the desired 
performance standards, CMS should have the authority not to utilize a state 
survey or state board in a given state to respond to beneficiary complaints. 
CMS could keep this responsibility with the QIO or designate another entity to 
fulfill that role. 
Remedies: QIOs have provided little in the way of remedies to beneficiar-
ies complaining of poor quality care. SAs and state medical boards have a 
much greater range of remedies at their disposal. In addition, the alternative 
entity would provide an opportunity to expand remedies to complainants. In his 
testimony before the Senate Special Committee on Aging in 1999, Mike Hash, 
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then Deputy Administrator ofHCF A, stated that an essential element of a com-
plaint process would be "interactions between complaint investigations and li-
censure and certification systems, the legal system, and facility-level grievance 
or continuous quality improvement processes."200 A more robust complaint 
system would provide compensation for individuals harmed as a result of poor 
quality health care. Additionally, it would provide beneficiaries with an oppor-
tunity to meet with providers; receive an apology and explanation of what hap-
pened; initiate an investigation of substandard care; and provide compensation 
to individuals harmed as a result of poor quality health care. Such a system, 
therefore, might incorporate elements of what has traditionally taken place in 
the courts through medical malpractice litigation. While this would be a 
revolutionary reform proposal, there are a number of reasons why it might make 
sense in this context. First, it would allow beneficiaries "one stop shopping." 
They could file a complaint and have all of their needs and interests met. Sec-
ond, it would tie together the medical malpractice system and the quality im-
provement system in a way that has not been possible under the current "silo" 
based responses to poor quality care.201 The proposed reform would allow for 
an administratively-based compensation system rather than a trial-based system. 
The former could allow for an expert panel of reviewers to determine the ap-
propriate level of compensation. Ideally, compensation levels would be tied to 
standards that would provide consistency across similar injuries. Criteria for 
damage payments could be "fault based" or could rely on a broader standard, 
200. Hash, Hearing Testimony, supra note 117. 
201. William Sage and Eleanor Kinney have proposed the idea of a Medicare led reform to 
the medical malpractice system. See William M. Sage & Eleanor D. Kinney, A Malpractice 
System for Medicare, in MEDICAL MALPRACTICE REFORM IN THE UNITED STATES: NEW CENTURY, 
DIFFERENT ISSUES 318 (William M. Sage & Rogan Kersh eds., 2006); Eleanor D. Kinney & 
William M. Sage, Resolving Medical Malpractice Claims in the Medicare Program: Can It Be 
Done? 12 CoNN. INs. L.J. 77, 77 (2005). To the extent that the reform proposal would focus on 
Medicare beneficiaries, Sage has provided a number of reasons for the approach. First, hear-
gues that the conventional malpractice litigation process serves Medicare beneficiaries very 
poorly. Based on empirical data from Texas he asserts that "[e]lderly patients file fewer claims 
and receive lower payments when they do pursue legal action" than do younger patients. Wil-
liam M. Sage, The Role of Medicare in Medical Malpractice Reform, 9 J. HEALTH CAREL. & 
PoL'Y 2 17, 221 (2006). He lists several explanations for this disparity: 
Elderly patients tend not to realize that they have suffered negligent inju-
ries. Even if they recognize a problem, seniors depend on their doctors and 
hospitals and often do not want to alienate them by filing a lawsuit. If eld-
erly patients do seek redress, their lower remaining life expectancies and 
reduced employment rates are less likely to generate damages substantial 
enough to induce lawyers, who are often paid on contingency, to accept 
them as clients. Lawyers also know that it is difficult to settle cases involv-
ing elderly clients because causation of injury is seldom clear-cut in pa-
tients with pre-existing illnesses. Nor can elderly clients easily endure the 
long delays involved in litigation .. . . 
Jd. at 223-24. 
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such as avoidable adverse events. Beneficiaries could choose whether to pur-
sue the administrative system or the traditional tort system. 
A final criterion that needs to be considered in this evaluation is the extent 
to which state survey agencies and state medical boards would be willing to 
take on this task. The directors of state survey agencies with whom we spoke 
seemed willing to take on this task, assuming it would be accompanied by addi-
tional resources. In fact, they seemed to think that it was inappropriate that 
QIOs were currently handling complaints. We are less certain of the willing-
ness of state medical boards to take this on. Many boards are not part of the 
state's executive branch and operate independently or semi-independently. In 
addition, while state survey agencies already are partly federally funded and 
have federal obligations tied to this funding, state medical boards have little to 
do with federal agencies, except perhaps when dealing with Medicare fraud or 
DEA issues like drug diversion which requires working with state and federal 
prosecutors. CMS would likely need to contract with Boards to perform this 
function for additional funding. Through such a contract mechanism, CMS 
could specify a uniform complaint process with which the Boards would be 
obliged to comply. State medical boards, however, have been highly resistant 
to federalization (though more recently they have been undertaking some ac-
tions in coordination with federal agencies like cancer databases and model 
programs). Whether or not additional funding would be sufficient to entice 
boards to take on this role is unclear. 
V. CONCLUSION 
This paper explores the history ofQIOs and their responsiveness to Medi-
care beneficiary complaints regarding the quality of their health care. Based on 
the recent 10M report recommendations that QIOs may not be the best home 
for this function, we explore an alternative entity that might take on this func-
tion. This alternative takes advantage of the significant experience and exper-
tise of state survey agencies and state medical boards in responding to 
patient/consumer complaints about an individual or institutional health care 
provider. Neither the QIO nor the proposed alternative is an "ideal" process. 
Each has strengths and weaknesses. For example, QIOs have significant exper-
tise when it comes to evaluating quality of care complaints; however, they have 
not been accessible to beneficiaries and often have not provided adequate ex-
planations to beneficiaries about their investigation into allegations of poor 
quality care. Moreover, they have limited authority to implement corrective 
action and appear to be reluctant to use the authority they do have. As com-
pared to state entities, QIOs have little experience responding to beneficiary 
complaints. 
State survey agencies and state medical boards have significant experience 
responding to complaints and are very accessible to consumers and patients. 
They are perhaps "closer to the ground" when it comes to knowing what goes 
on in different institutions and in the medical community. On the other hand, 
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in many cases they lack the resources to respond to complaints in a timely and 
thorough manner. While some state survey agencies have excellent systems in 
place to respond to complaints, including quality improvement systems, others 
are much less sophisticated in their operations. Recent efforts by CMS to 
monitor state agency performance in responding to complaints based on institu-
tional care should improve state agency performance in responding to com-
plaints across the board. The weak link in the alternative entity, however, is 
state medical boards, which lack CMS oversight and, in some states, operate 
independently of the executive branch. CMS could potentially overcome this 
weakness by contracting with state boards to participate in the complaint re-
sponse process. 
Although we did not evaluate the feasibility of an entirely new entity to 
handle beneficiary complaints, some of the pros and cons of a new entity are 
readily apparent. In comparison to the hybrid structure we propose, the new 
entity would be subject to CMS oversight and would likely be adequately 
funded upon its creation, at least for the first several years. Further, the entity 
would be focused wholly on Medicare complaints and would therefore, argua-
bly, have a greater stake in seeking resolution of those complaints and the is-
sues underlying them. In an atmosphere of limited health care dollars, 
however, it may be impractical to create a new entity that would duplicate the 
efforts of existing state organizations that are currently charged with complaint 
investigation and resolution. 
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Appendix A 202 
Element Characteristics of an 
Effective Complaint 
Process 
1. Accessibility Complainants are aware of the 
system and find it easy to use. 
2. Investigative capacity Appropriate experts, resources, 
and methods are available to assess 
complaints and determine if they are 
part of an underlying pattern. 
3. Interventions and fol- Substantiated complaints result in 
low-through appropriate corrective action. Monitor-
ing assures compliance. 
4. Quality improvement Complaints guide quality 1m-
orientation provement efforts. 
5. Responsiveness Responses to complainants are 
regular, substantive, and clear. 
6. Timeliness Each step is completed within an 
established, reasonable time frame, and 
mechanisms exist to deal with emer-
gent complaints in an expedited man-
ner. 
7. Objectivity The review process is unbiased, 
balancing the rights of each party. 
8. Public accountability Complaint information is made 
available to the public. 
202. 2001 OJG REPORT, supra note 2, at 6. 
